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Article 4

TEARING DOWN THE WALL: HOW TRANSFER-ON-DEATH
REAL-ESTATE DEEDS CHALLENGE THE INTER
VIVOS/TESTAMENTARY 1 DIVIDE
DANAYA C. WRIGHT ∗ & STEPHANIE L. EMRICK ∗∗
ABSTRACT
This Article will examine one of the most recent will substitutes,
the transfer-on-death (“TOD”) real-estate deed. Nearly half of
the states have recognized, through common-law forms or legislation, a mechanism to allow for the transfer of real property on
death without using a will, without following the will formalities,
and without necessitating probate. This new tool in the estate
planner’s toolbox is invaluable: revocable trusts have proven too
expensive for decedents of modest means, and wills continue to
require formalities that can easily frustrate non-lawyer-drafted
estate documents. But the variety of TOD deed rules and mechanisms that the different states have adopted has led to disparity
and uncertainty in form and outcome, resulting in litigation and
frustration of decedent’s intent.
We believe this uncertainty and frustration will continue as
even more states adopt the Uniform Real Property Transfer on
Death Act (“URPTODA”), 2 which purports to stabilize the law
and facilitate testamentary intent. States grappling with this new
form interpose significant differences, and lawyers and judges
are not all on the same page as to the consequences. One source
of confusion is the URPTODA’s provision that TOD deeds are
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1. ROLAND BARTHES, S/Z 107 (Richard Miller trans., Hill and Wang 1992) (1970) (“[I]t is
the slash of censure, the surface of the mirror, the wall of hallucination, the verge of antithesis, the
abstraction of limit, the obliquity of the signifier, the index of the paradigm, hence of meaning[!]”).
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non-testamentary and, at the same time, the Uniform Act provides
that the property rights do not transfer until death. 3
Although it is one thing to declare that TOD deeds are nontestamentary even though property rights don’t transfer until
death—which in itself goes against centuries of formal legal
rules—it is quite another to get all the other legal consequences
to fall into place accordingly. For instance, would a state’s antilapse statute apply to save a beneficiary designation if the deed is
deemed non-testamentary, even though the intent is to have the
real property transfer upon death?
In our opinion, the TOD deed pushes the juridical binary of inter vivos and testamentary transfers beyond coherence and rationality. The law of will substitutes has already undermined the
rationality of maintaining the divide, and in this Article, we will
argue that the time has finally come to reject the division between
inter vivos and testamentary transfers and seek a rational and holistic set of tools and formalities to gain the benefits of probate
avoidance that will substitutes provide with the ease of control
and full revocability of wills. Elevating form over functionality,
although a characteristic of the common law, inevitably disserves
the interests of those who cannot afford lawyers who can easily
draft around the sometimes-arcane distinctions between testamentary and inter vivos transfers to gain the benefits of each
while avoiding the burdens.

3. Transfers of property can occur during the owner’s life, in which case they are termed
inter vivos or non-testamentary, and they are subject to certain rules requiring intent and delivery.
Transfers of property that occur at death are termed testamentary and are subject to different rules,
usually requiring transfer according to a validly executed will or the laws of intestate succession.
Many tax and property rules depend on the distinction between inter-vivos and testamentary transfers, although the line between these is blurring. The URPTODA has a contradiction built in
when it provides that property rights do not transfer until death in Section 5, which would make it
seem testamentary, while in Section 7, the statute declares that the TOD deed is non-testamentary.
UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT §§ 5, 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
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I. INTRODUCTION 4
In Shakespeare’s tragedy King Lear, 5 the protagonist faces a universal
human dilemma: when he gets tired of the work of maintaining his kingdom, does he give up his property and power to his daughters before he dies
upon a promise that they will care for him in his old age, or does he hang
onto it all until he dies, perhaps mismanaging it as he ages? 6 Old age and
the attendant period of decline and incapacity loom large in Lear’s imagination. The tragic outcome of Lear’s decision to give up his property and
hope his children would support him turned out to be foolhardy, as it
brought together all of those unfortunate circumstances of mental incapacity, ingratitude, greed, and helplessness. Yet, however we might try to learn
from Lear’s situation, we all face the same dilemma as we prepare for that
journey into the other world, although each person’s path is unique.

4. Certain descriptions of TOD deeds and their history appear in Transfer on Death Deeds:
It Is Time to Establish the Rules of the Game by Stephanie Emrick and appear here with the permission of the Florida Law Review. Stephanie Emrick, Note, Transfer on Death Deeds: It Is Time
to Establish the Rules of the Game, 70 FLA. L. REV. 469 (2018).
5. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR.
6. Id. at act 1, sc.1.
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The estates-and-trusts practitioner must become adept at deciphering
whether a client’s children are more like Regan and Goneril or more like
Cordelia, 7 and whether the client is going to require significant care and attention like Lear or is going to remain independent and strong-willed until
just moments before death. Armed with that knowledge, the practitioner
prepares an estate plan that maintains the client’s independence, transfers
the property into trust, disposes of it well before death when the client’s
mind is strong and intentions are clear, or ties it up with strings and conditions to protect the client during a protracted period of incapacity. The
practitioner also anticipates the transfer-tax effects of giving away property
during life or at death, as well as the income tax or capital gains taxes that
might attach to property because of changes in value. The practitioner also
considers whether the client, like Blanche DuBois, 8 has always relied on the
kindness of strangers or has been an independent spirit who, like Polonius,
would “[n]either a borrower nor a lender be.” 9 Facilitating the uniqueness
of each client’s approach to the universal metamorphosis of death makes
practicing in this area of law particularly rewarding.
Today’s practitioner has a much more robust toolbox than the estates
lawyer of Shakespeare’s day, Coke’s day, or Blackstone’s day. 10 To a great
extent, the probate revolution of the late twentieth century has been a steady
march toward extricating property owners from the Lear dilemma by
providing mechanisms to maintain as much control as possible over property up until the moment of death, but then providing for the smooth, private
transmission of that property to the designated beneficiaries without the
cost or delay of court-supervised probate proceedings, for the specter of
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce 11 also looms large in the public imagination. 12 The
7. For those not familiar with King Lear, Regan and Goneril resented their father, refused to
care for him according to the terms of his bequest, and ultimately cast him out where he perished
from exposure and a broken heart. Cordelia, his youngest daughter, tried to save him and care for
him out of true love, even though he had not given her any property, but her efforts came too late.
Only in his last moments did he learn the true character of his three children. See WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR.
8. See generally TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE (1947).
9. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 1, sc. 3,
line 75 (Bigelow, Smith & Co. 1909) (1603).
10. In terms of the basic mechanisms of estate planning, little changed between the Statute of
Wills of 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.), and the probate revolution of the late twentieth century. Sir
Edward Coke (1552–1634) and William Blackstone (1723–1780) would have likely recommended a will, a trust, or a strict settlement to accomplish the estate planning of the landed classes. By
the late twentieth century, there existed life insurance, payable-on-death (“POD”) securities accounts, and joint tenancies for bank accounts that were simply not available in their day. See J. H.
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 280–297 (4th ed. 2002) (explaining the
evolution of different mechanisms of estate planning and the different motivations during the last
few hundred years).
11. Jarndyce v. Jarndyce is the fictional probate case that looms over the plot of Charles
Dickens’ Bleak House. Eventually, the chancery case consumes the entire estate and all the bene-
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revocable trust, the joint tenancy, the transfer-on-death securities account,
as well as the old standby of the traditional life estate-and-remainder deed
all provide additional tools, besides the will and the default rules of intestate succession, to allow decedents to control their property until death, yet
designate its succession in the clearest, simplest manner that avoids probate
wherever possible. 13
The law has been both a help and a hindrance to this process of simplification, with its insistence on certain formalities to lessen the risk of fraud
and its reliance on centuries-old property rules that have made rigid the interests and processes of inter-generational transmission of wealth. The person who wants to retain complete control of property until the moment of
death may certainly do so, but then, to control distribution of the property
after death, the decedent must execute a will with the traps of forms and
formalities and the necessity of probate administration. 14 Testators who
want to avoid the difficulties of management during a period of incapacity,
or who clearly know the primary objects of their bounty and have a solid
safety net, may give away much of their property during life by making inter vivos gifts that are immediate and complete.15 But inter vivos gifts reficiaries are left penniless long after the actual parties have passed from memory. CHARLES
DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 15 (Nicola Bradbury ed., Penguin Books 2011) (1853).
12. See Kent D. Schenkel, The Trust-as-Will Portmanteau: Trill or Spork?, 27 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 40, 40 (2013) (discussing how trusts have become more will-like and wills should become more trust-like in order to ease some of the burdens of probate); see also John H. Langbein,
The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108,
1108–09 (1984) (using the term “nonprobate revolution” for the first time to describe an era of
probate avoidance); Grayson M. P. McCouch, Probate Law Reform and Nonprobate Transfers, 62
U. MIAMI L. REV. 757, 759–60 (2008) (discussing the era of large-scale probate avoidance that
began in the mid-twentieth century).
13. See Grayson M.P. McCouch, Will Substitutes Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code,
58 BROOK. L. REV. 1123, 1194 (1993) (concluding that “[w]ill substitutes flourish because they
implement simple, routine deathtime transfers more promptly and efficiently than the probate system”).
14. C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislation Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward
Amorphism, Part One: The Wills Act Formula, The Rite of Testation, and the Question of Intent:
A Problem in Search of a Solution, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 176 (1991) [hereinafter Miller, Part
One]; C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislation Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward
Amorphism, Part Two: Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503 and a Counterproposal, 43 FLA. L.
REV. 599, 199–204 (1991) [hereinafter Miller, Part Two].
15. Giving property away during life eases the succession of property at death because the
property is no longer in the decedent’s estate and does not need to be administered or probated.
But to gain the full benefits of inter vivos transfers, donors usually need to give away the full bundle of sticks; they cannot retain lifetime use or control without risking a determination that the
property transfer will be deemed testamentary. See Austin W. Bramwell & Elisabeth O. Madden,
Toggling Gross Estate Inclusion On and Off: A Powerful Strategy, EST. PLAN., Mar. 2017, at 3;
see also, e.g., ALVIN ARNOLD & MYRON KOVE, REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONAL’S TAX GUIDE
§ 42:12 (Supp. 2018); Malcolm L. Morris, The Tax Posture of Gifts in Estate Planning: Dinosaur
or Dynasty?, 64 NEB. L. REV. 25 (1985).
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quire giving up an ownership interest. Thus, property owners often try to
give up as few property rights as possible to retain control but make it appear that an inter vivos transfer has been made. 16 Yet, as the Duke of Norfolk quipped, 17 we may want to have our cake and eat it too, but the lawmakers of Norfolk’s day, and ours, seem to think we are too weak-natured
to be given such freedom. 18 Most of us with a modest amount of property
want a very simple process: to control the property fully until death, but
then have it pass smoothly to designated beneficiaries without the cost and
delays of court-supervised probate administration. 19 And better yet, we
want a simple process to make changes to our donative documents that do
not require locking ourselves up with witnesses and a notary until the ritual
execution is complete. 20 But the law of succession does not yet give us
what we want. Instead, it gives us what long-dead common lawyers
16. Property owners have many reasons for wanting to make certain gifts appear to be one
thing (inter vivos or testamentary), when they are really the other, and estate planning courses
spend months parsing the distinctions so that estate plans can be drafted to get the best of both
mechanisms. For instance, gifts made during life often are not included in the elective share calculation, so testators will try to keep control over property until death but part with enough property rights to make the transfer count as an inter vivos transfer that removes the property from the
surviving spouse’s elective share. Or, to take advantage of the unlimited marital deduction, testators may transfer wealth to a surviving spouse in a Qualified Terminable Interest Property trust
that qualifies as a transfer to the spouse, but in fact significantly limits the spouse’s control over
the property. See Trav Baxter, The Impact of Tax Reform on Estate Planning, MITCHELL
WILLIAMS: BETWEEN THE LINES BLOG (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.mitchellwilliamslaw.com/theimpact-of-tax-reform-on-estate-planning.
17. 13 LETTERS AND PAPERS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, OF THE REIGN OF HENRY VIII pt. 1,
at 189 (James Gairdner ed., London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1892).
18. The primary reason given for insisting on the formalities of will execution is to prevent
duress and fraud by beneficiaries against weakened testators. The mortmain statutes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries also were based on the assumption that the elderly would succumb
to threats of eternal damnation if they did not leave adequate bequests to the church. Protecting
the elderly from their own weakness is a principle function of the formalities in estates law. By
allowing testators to execute instruments transferring property at their death without any of the
formalities’ protections, legislators fear that overreaching by trustees, beneficiaries, financial
planners, life insurance agents, and the like will seriously frustrate the true intentions of decedents
and deprive intended beneficiaries of their bequests. See Miller, Part One, supra note 14, at 201–
04.
19. See Edward F. Koren, Preparation and Uses of Trusts, in 2 EST. TAX & PERS. FIN. PLAN.
§ 19:15 (2018) (discussing the length of time required to probate a typical estate and the potential
delays that can prolong the process); George M. Turner, Problems With the Probate System, in 1
REVOCABLE TRUSTS 5th § 7:2 (2018) (analyzing the cost of probate and the controversies that
arise); Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 559–63 (2008) (analyzing how
the privacy aspects of trusts can be harmful to settlors, beneficiaries, and even trustees).
20. Most states’ statutes of wills require a multitude of formalities, including signing at the
bottom of the will, in front of witnesses, the witnesses signing in the presence of each other, and
the testator acknowledging the will and/or the testator’s signature. The Uniform Probate Code
(“UPC”) provides an attestation form and ritual process that satisfies the will formalities of every
state in the UPC. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-502 to -504 (1969) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended
2010); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 732.501–.502 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 4-101
to -102 (LexisNexis 2018); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 3-1.1–.2 (LexisNexis 2018).
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thought we needed: a distinct line between inter vivos and testamentary
transfers with significant legal consequences attendant on each.
Despite the fact that Coke and Blackstone would be deeply concerned
by the opportunities for fraud and overreaching that may arise when we do
away with probate and the will formalities, the probate revolution has
moved the ideal closer for many decedents through a variety of will substitutes, including, but not limited to, revocable trusts, life insurance, and
transfer-on-death (“TOD”) or payable-on-death (“POD”) beneficiary designations in securities accounts, bank accounts, and other contractual arrangements. These mechanisms all allow for almost completely unfettered
control during life and smooth transmission to successors without courtsupervised probate. But until recently, land has withstood the modernization of the age-old laws of succession. If the land was not transferred during life, either directly to a donee or into a trust, the transfer of the real
property at death would not be effective without court-supervised probate
administration. If a landowner wanted to control the disposition of the real
property at death, and not have it pass according to the intestacy statutes,
the real property had to be disposed of by a will, which required compliance
with the will formalities. Historically, there was only one other alternative—a risky alternative that was less than ideal—the landowner could deed
away the remainder and retain only a life estate, which meant relinquishing
significant control over the land during life. 21 Although securities, bank accounts, and personal property could be easily transferred at death outside
probate without having to give up lifetime control and without making a
will, land could only pass outside probate through a trust or an inter vivos
transfer. Yet, if a $500,000 securities account could pass using a beneficiary designation, why couldn’t a $100,000 home pass the same way? 22
After all, most people’s single largest asset is the family home, and but for
that asset, they could easily avoid probate through the usual will substitutes.
Enter the beneficiary real-estate deed. 23 The beneficiary deed has
been referred to by a multitude of terms through the years, but the most
21. This of course is a bad idea, as legal life estates are difficult to manage during the life
tenancy. See In re Will of Hall, 456 S.E.2d 439, 440 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (illustrating the problems of dealing with a legal life estate followed by alternate contingent future interests).
22. See Michael A. Kirtland & Catherine Anne Seal, The Significance of the Transfer-onDeath Deed, PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 2007, at 42, 42–43 (discussing how “[t]he concept of
transfer-on-death deeds is directly comparable to the use of pay-on-death or transfer-on-death accounts at banks or with brokerage houses”).
23. See id.; Dennis M. Horn & Susan N. Gary, Death Without Probate TOD Deeds-The Latest Tool in the Toolbox, PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2010, at 12, 13 (discussing the need for “flexible legal tools to allow individuals to transfer . . . property . . . on death while preserving the individual’s right to change his or her mind during life”); Susan N. Gary, Transfer-on-Death Deeds:
The Nonprobate Revolution Continues, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 529, 540 (2006) (examining the advantages and disadvantages of TOD Deeds).
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common term used in legislation seems to be transfer-on-death deed. 24
This term is often shortened to TOD deed 25 or occasionally fully abbreviated to TODD. 26 However, the terms beneficiary deed, 27 revocable transferon-death deed (“RTOD”), 28 non-testamentary transfer, 29 and deed upon
death 30 are used as well with little or no distinction as to how the transfers
operate. All of these deeds have extended the probate revolution to real
property by allowing landowners to execute a real-estate deed with a beneficiary designation that, if not revoked before the landowner’s death, results
in the land automatically transferring to the designated beneficiary outside
of probate. 31 And after lengthy study and consultation of a variety of state
beneficiary-deed statutes, the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”) has recommended a Uniform Real Property Transfer on Death Act (“URPTODA”)
that has been adopted in fourteen states and the District of Columbia.32
Roughly half of states today have a mechanism, of one sort or another, to
permit the transfer of land at death through some form of beneficiary
deed. 33 Some of those states have recognized enhanced-life-estate deeds,
sometimes known as ladybird deeds, through common law, while others
have passed legislation, in some variation of the URPTODA or other legislation, that expressly permits the use of statutory beneficiary deeds.34
Because of the diverse nomenclature surrounding these deeds, we refer
to TOD deeds in their generic form as real-estate deeds that allow a transferor to retain control of the real property during life yet provide for a bene24. The term “transfer-on-death deed” is preferred by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) in drafting the Uniform Real Property Transfer on
Death Act (“URPTODA”). According to the Comment to Paragraph 6, “[t]he term ‘transfer on
death deed’ is preferred, to be consistent with the transfer on death registration of securities.”
UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 2 CMT., para. 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
25. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3501 (2005).
26. See, e.g., In re Estate of Carlson, 367 P.3d 486, 489 (Okla. 2016).
27. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-405 (2014).
28. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 5642 (West Supp. 2018).
29. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-18-101 (2017).
30. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111.661 (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).
31. Gary, supra note 23, at 534; Julie Garber, How to Use TOD or Beneficiary Deeds to
Avoid Probate, THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/use-deeds-avoid-probate-3505250
(last updated Nov. 8, 2018). Transfer is not entirely automatic, but the beneficiary usually only
needs to file a death certificate with the property recorder’s office and have a new deed recorded
in the beneficiary’s name to perfect the transfer.
32. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009); see Memorandum from Thomas P. Gallanis, Professor of Law, Washington & Lee Univ., to Drafting
Comm.
for
Unif.
TOD
for
Real
Prop.
Act
(Feb.
14,
2007),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFile
Key=02bb980a-faf7-48fa-fae0-e03d818e6068&forceDialog=0 (describing background information about drafting a Uniform TOD for Real Property Act).
33. David Major, Revocable Transfer on Death Deeds: Cheap, Simple, and Has California’s
Trusts & Estates Attorneys Heading for the Hills, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 285, 291 (2009).
34. See infra Section III.B.
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ficiary designation naming a person who will take the real estate upon the
transferor’s death. All of the TOD deed forms allowed by statute have the
same basic structure in that no property rights transfer until the death of the
transferor, although there are important differences regarding co-ownership,
lapse, revocability, and other legal implications of these true TOD deeds. 35
We also discuss the enhanced-life-estate deeds that are generally the product of the common law, are not statutorily recognized, and seem to give
away a remainder interest of some sort inter vivos, while the transferor retains only a life estate. Even though the transferor retains the right to revoke
the remainder as well as the right to manage and maintain the real property
as a fee owner, enhanced-life-estate deeds may function differently than
true TOD deeds. 36 When referring to the entire universe of deeds that attempt to achieve this TOD effect, we use the more generic term beneficiary
deed, even though that does not fully capture the range of deed forms that
exist to accomplish essentially the same goal.
The key advantages of a beneficiary designation for real property include retained control for the transferor during life, simplicity of execution,
full revocability, and probate avoidance. 37 The most important characteristic of the beneficiary deed is that the owner or grantor retains virtually
complete control during his or her lifetime. Because no property interests
vest in the beneficiary until the transferor’s death, the transferor retains
complete control to amend, modify, or revoke the beneficiary designation
during the transferor’s lifetime. Additional benefits also accrue when possession and title to the property transfers upon death rather than inter vivos
at the time of the execution of the deed, which is the case with true TOD
deeds, although perhaps not with enhanced-life-estate deeds. Unlike taking
title as joint tenants with right of survivorship, this form of transfer does not
trigger the negative tax consequences of a completed gift during the owner’s lifetime, nor does the property owner have to give up an ownership in-

35. Gary, supra note 23, at 534.
36. The enhanced life estate is something of a chimera. In a standard life estate deed, the
transferor gives away everything but the life estate, making it clear that the remaindermen have
received some future interests inter vivos. But with an enhanced-life-estate deed, the most the
remaindermen receive is a contingent right to receive the property if the life tenant dies without
revoking it. In that sense it functions like a will, except that under a will absolutely nothing passes to the beneficiary until death. With an enhanced-life-estate deed, some sort of contingent future interest has passed to the remaindermen, even if that contingency is not a recognizable property right. Although the typical enhanced-life-estate deed functions like the TOD deed in that the
transferor retains full power to manage the property during life and the possession and title shift
only upon death, the enhanced-life-estate deed allows for some customization of the retained
powers in a way that the TOD deed does not.
37. See Major, supra note 33, at 302–06 (purporting that the primary advantage of transfer
on death deeds is their simplicity); see also Gary, supra note 23, at 542–43 (discussing the many
advantages of TOD deeds).
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terest during life. 38 Moreover, the property is protected from the creditors
of any of the beneficiaries until the time of the transferor’s death. 39 The
property is also protected from the transferor’s creditors upon the transferor’s death as a non-probate asset, except to the extent that the real estate itself secures the underlying debt. 40 Finally, the transferor may continue to
exercise the normal rights of a property owner, including the right to sell or
mortgage the property and receive applicable tax exemptions.41
Moreover, the cost of transferring real property assets through beneficiary deeds is much less expensive than the cost of transferring property
through a trust or a will. 42 The cost of a probate proceeding is often substantial, and in nearly all cases will exceed the cost of having a beneficiary
deed prepared. 43 While preparing a trust to avoid probate may in fact cost
less than the probate proceeding itself, the preparation of the trust along
with the subsequent transfer of assets into the trust will almost always exceed the costs associated with beneficiary deeds. 44 For an average person
with few assets, “the overall cost of using a revocable trust to transfer those
assets may be substantial in comparison with the value of the assets being
transferred.” 45
Additionally, the beneficiary deed allows the transferor to revoke the
beneficiary designation at any time during life through a straightforward
process, which is set out by law in states that have enacted legislation. 46
“[G]enerally all that is required is the filing of a revocation of the [beneficiary deed] prior to the grantor owner’s death.” 47 Because no property interest passes to the beneficiary until the death of the transferor, such revocation does not require the named beneficiary, or beneficiaries, to join. 48
Transferors wishing to modify the beneficiaries to a particular piece of real
property can simply execute and record a subsequent beneficiary deed,
which will supersede the previous transfer and become the effective deed

38. See Gary, supra note 23, at 542; see Catherine Anne Seal & Michael A. Kirtland, The
Transfer-on-Death Deed in the Elder Law Setting, 4 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’YS J. 71, 73–75
(2008) (discussing the tax concerns of transferring real property assets during life).
39. Gary, supra note 23, at 542–43.
40. Amanda Kreshover, Transfer on Death Deed, HOUS. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2016, at 40, 40.
41. Id.
42. Gary, supra note 23, at 542–43.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 543.
46. Keriann L. Riehle, Comment, TODDs: A Transfer on Death Dilemma? A Comprehensive
Analysis of Minnesota’s Transfer on Death Deed Statute—MINN. STAT. § 507.071, 9 WM.
MITCHELL J.L. & PRAC. 1, 4 (2015).
47. Id.
48. Gary, supra note 23, at 542.
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when the transferor dies. 49 When compared to the traditional joint tenancy,
the revocability and flexibility of the beneficiary deed provides a clear advantage to the transferor in giving the ability to modify an estate plan during life while still avoiding probate.50
A brief discussion of the diversity of beneficiary deed mechanisms,
however, illustrates the need for statutory clarification and uniformity. Despite the basic similarities, the variety of statutory and common-law mechanisms has led to significant operational differences that create traps for the
unwary estate planner. 51 And even the Uniform Act may sometimes produce results that are contrary to the intentions of the drafters and many clients. For example, unlike other will substitutes, the URPTODA’s provisions that no property rights transfer until death on the one hand,52 and
declarations on the other that the TOD deed is non-testamentary 53 and,
therefore, not subject to the will formalities, seem like an inconsistency
likely to lead to significant interpretive confusion. But, ultimately, the
problem lies not with the beneficiary-deed mechanism so much as with the
arcane legal distinction between inter vivos and testamentary transfers; a
distinction that has become so riddled with exceptions and statutory workarounds it has become “[m]ore honour’d in the breach than the observance.” 54
In this Article, we will begin with a brief history of the common law’s
unique treatment of land and then explain the beneficiary real-estate deed
and the variety of mechanisms that have been adopted in various states to
achieve TOD results. 55 We then briefly discuss the Uniform Act and the
specific way it resolves certain problems. 56 Next, we turn to a number of
important situations that we argue need further attention from lawmakers,
including the questions of revocability and the workings of the beneficiary
deed in the context of powers of appointment. 57 There are also serious
questions about the mechanics of the deed in the case of creditor claims of

49. A subsequent beneficiary deed revokes all previous beneficiary designations in their entirety, even if the subsequent deed does not convey the owner’s entire interest in the property. 2
JOYCE PALOMAR, PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 333 n.5.70 (3d ed. 2003 & Supp.
2012). At the owner’s death, the most recently executed beneficiary deed or revocation of all
beneficiary deeds recorded before the owner’s death controls, regardless of the order of recording.
Id.
50. See Riehle, supra note 46, at 4.
51. See Memorandum from Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 32, at appx. (reproducing all the
state TOD statutes and discussing the differences within each provision).
52. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
53. Id. § 7.
54. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 9, at act 1, sc. 4, line 16.
55. See infra Part II.
56. See infra Part III.
57. See infra Part IV.
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joint tenants, grantors, and beneficiaries or remaindermen, as well as potential problems with lapse and the consequences of future-interests determinations. Finally, we conclude that the legal distinction between testamentary
transfers and inter vivos transfers needs to be rejected as artificial, unnecessary, and counter-productive in today’s legal landscape. We end with a call
to eschew formalistic distinctions that only serve to hinder testamentary intentions without securing the important benefits that are, or should be, the
hallmark of today’s modern succession law. 58
II. THE UNIQUENESS OF LAND AND THE ADOPTION OF THE BENEFICIARY
DEED FOR REAL ESTATE
For centuries in England, and then in the United States, real and personal property were treated differently at death. In England before the 1540
Statute of Wills, 59 decedents could execute a testament for distribution of
personal property, which would be administered in the ecclesiastical courts,
but could not execute a will for real property. 60 After 1540, the same legal
document could be used to dispose of both real and personal property by
men and unmarried women, but even then only two-thirds of the real property could be disposed of by will before 1645. 61 After 1645, all real and
personal property could be disposed of by a will, but the law still treated real and personal property differently. 62 Personal property was deemed to
pass to the executor upon death, while real property passed immediately to
the designated heirs or beneficiaries. 63 Dower rights of surviving spouses
also differed based on whether the estate consisted of real or personal property. 64
In the United States, similar distinctions existed in many state probate
codes, and some continue even today. 65 Dower or elective-share rights
58. See infra Part V.
59. 32 Hen. 8, c. 1.
60. Both wills and testaments are legal documents disposing of property at death. The testament was used in the ecclesiastical courts to dispose of personal property only, and the will was
used in the law courts to dispose of real property. Today many will drafters use the term will and
testament out of habit even though the law does not distinguish between the two anymore. See
BAKER, supra note 10, at 254–57 (discussing why wills for land were not allowed); see also Miller, Part One, supra note 14, at 196–200.
61. BAKER, supra note 10, at 254–57; Miller, Part One, supra note 14, at 196–200; see Tenures Abolition Act 1660, 12 Car. 2, c. 24.
62. BAKER, supra note 10, at 386–87.
63. 1 WIGGINS WILLS & ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA, § 19:1 (4th
ed. 2005) (citing 2 J.G. WOERNER, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION
§ 201 (3d ed. 1923)).
64. BAKER, supra note 10, at 269–71, 386–87.
65. Distinctions between real and personal property are found in the elective share statutes of
several states. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.238 (West Supp. 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 392.020 (West 2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-25-2(a) (2011). They are also found in the intestacy
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might attach only to real or only to personal property. 66 Homestead rights
usually attach only to real property. 67 Estates that contain real property are
often ineligible for summary administration.68 And, consistent with the old
common-law distinctions between real and personal property, the law of
concurrent estates continues to differentiate between real property and personal property when determining, at the time a gift is made, if someone’s
name is added to a real-estate deed or to a bank account. If a joint tenancy
is created through a transfer of an interest in real property, the presumption
is that a gift is made of half the real estate at the time the co-owner’s name
is added. 69 But if a joint owner is added to a bank account, courts usually
attribute ownership on the basis of intent and contribution to the fund and
not the formalities of title. 70 Joint tenancies of real property often still require the four unities, while joint tenancies of bank accounts do not. 71
The court-supervised probate process has always been a necessary
price to pay for using a will and thus retaining full control over property until death. But as the probate revolution unfolded throughout the last half of
the twentieth century, lawyers, clients, and legislators pushed to enable
property owners to transfer personal property at death using a variety of different mechanisms that allowed them to avoid probate. 72 For example, life
insurance came about via a contract provision that an insurer would pay
statutes of Rhode Island and Texas. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1-10 (2011); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 38(b)(1) (West 2003).
66. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-11-301(a) (real property), 28-11-305 (personal property) (2012); D.C. CODE § 19-301 (2001) (real estate and surplus personal property); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 633.238 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.020 (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 191 § 15 (West); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-25-2(a) (real estate only).
67. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6500, 6520–27 (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 561.11–.12 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188, § 4 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 524.2-402 (West 2012); W. VA. Code ANN. § 38-9-1 (LexisNexis 2011).
68. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-2-692(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016); CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 13101(a) (West Supp. 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2306(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016); FLA.
STAT. § 735.301–02 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:3-1201 (LexisNexis 2015); 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-1(a) (West Supp. 2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-7-322(1); N.Y. SURR.
CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 1302 (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 28A-25-1(a), 28A-251.1(a) (2015); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3102 (West Supp. 2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 33-24-1–2 (2011).
69. 1 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 5:43 (3d ed. 2005);
John V. Orth, Presumed Equal: Shares of Cotenants, 37 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. L.J. 463,
464–65 (2011).
70. See Deposit of Fund Belonging to Depositor in Bank Account in Name of Himself and
Another, 149 A.L.R. 879 (1944), and the cases cited therein, such as Williams v. Tuch (In re Estates of Williams), 39 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. 1942), and Allstaedt v. Ochs, 4 N.W.2d 530 (Mich.
1942).
71. The four unities of time, title, interest, and possession meant that joint tenancies of real
property had to be created at the same time, with the same instrument, and grant each joint tenant
the same interest and the full right to possession. See Gardner v. Gardner, 25 Md. App. 638, 335
A.2d 157 (1975); Alexander v. Boyer, 253 Md. 511, 253 A.2d 359 (1969).
72. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 1115–25; McCouch, supra note 13, at 1124–31.

524

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:511

benefits to a designated beneficiary if the insured made regular premium
payments. 73 Life insurance was not a direct transfer of property from the
decedent to the beneficiary; rather, it was a contractual right to have the
company pay the beneficiary if the insured died during the term of the contract. 74 Similarly, the revocable trust permitted a property owner to transfer
property to a trustee during life, with instructions to transfer that property at
the settlor’s death according to a set of instructions laid down in advance.75
Contract and trust law defined the rights and responsibilities of the various
parties and gave some assurances that property transfers were not fraudulent and appropriately reflected the decedent’s intentions. Then came TOD
and POD bank and securities accounts. These types of accounts, held by
banks or securities companies, rested again on contract law.76 They provided that if a decedent designated a particular beneficiary on an account, the
company would transfer or pay to that beneficiary the proceeds of the account upon the account holder’s death. Contract and trust law thus provided mechanisms to circumvent the strict probate rules that required inter vivos transfers of property to be physically delivered during life or
testamentary transfers of property to go through the probate process and be
guided by a will signed with the appropriate will formalities. 77
The beneficiary real-estate deed does not fall neatly into the category
of will substitutes, however, because no third party (insurance company,
bank, securities company, or trustee) is obligated by contract or trust law to
perform a duty to transfer or pay over the decedent’s property. Instead, the
landowner simply executes and records a deed that designates a beneficiary
to take the landowner’s real property if the landowner dies without having
revoked the beneficiary designation. In this sense, it is more like a will than
a contract, for it designates who takes the property upon death, and it is fully revocable by the decedent up until death. But the beneficiary real-estate
deed does not fall neatly into the trust or will category either. There is no
trustee bound by a fiduciary duty to comply with any trust provisions, nor is

73. Gary, supra note 23, at 534–35; UNIF. PROB. CODE § 6-101 (1969) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N, amended 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 7.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2001).
74. See Miller, Part One, supra note 14, at 264–65.
75. See Gary, supra note 23, at 537.
76. Most states have since adopted legislation to permit standby trusts or POD/TOD designations. The UPC has a number of provisions to validate will substitutes that would likely not be
valid in the absence of statutory authorization. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 6-101 to -102, 6301 to -311 (1969) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010).
77. Admittedly, this was not a complete circumvention because possession of the property
was technically in the hands of the bank or securities company.

2019]

TEARING DOWN THE WALL

525

there a probate court supervising the transfer of the real property. 78 One of
the big questions facing courts, lawmakers, and scholars regarding the beneficiary deed is whether it is testamentary (like a will) or inter vivos (like a
trust or a joint account) and how the law should incorporate protections
against duress and fraud if it is deemed non-testamentary. 79 If deemed testamentary, the deed would presumably need to be executed according to the
will formalities. If deemed inter vivos, one would presume the requirements of a present transfer of a property right.
For centuries, a bright line existed between an inter vivos gift, which
requires the present transfer of a property right to the beneficiary-grantee
during the grantor’s lifetime, 80 and a testamentary gift, which requires a
will executed with the will formalities, or the strict rules of intestate succession. 81 This made sense in a world when most property was tangible, when
corporate forms and contracts did not aspire to manage the succession of
property at death, and when probate was as easy as inviting the justice of
the peace to the funeral to oversee the disposition of the property. 82 For the
sophisticated elite, property could be transferred inter vivos to avoid the
feudal incidents by splitting up ownership over time, or across multiple
grantees. 83 And, the modern will substitutes all gesture toward an inter vivos transfer of an ownership interest to move the transfer beyond the need
for will formalities and probate. Thus, a fee owner who transfers a remainder and retains a life estate makes a present transfer of the remainder.84 So
too does the grantor who adds another’s name to a joint bank account or to
a parcel of real estate. 85 Revocable trusts are deemed to be inter vivos because a trust obligation is placed on the property when it is retitled into

78. Deeds are of record and courts can enforce the deed as with any real property transfer,
but if a beneficiary fails to retitle the real property, there is no third-party fiduciary, account manager, or trustee with a legal duty to effectuate the transfer.
79. See infra Part V.
80. See Gary, supra note 23, at 535; Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600, 603 (Ill. 1955)
(upholding as an inter vivos trust stock with a beneficiary designation that would pass to the beneficiary only at the death of the settlor).
81. Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Distributive Justice and Donative Intent, 65 UCLA L. REV.
324, 336 (2018) (discussing the resulting intestacy that occurs when the will execution formalities
are not met).
82. See generally AMY LOUISE ERICKSON, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND (1993).
83. See BAKER, supra note 10, at 259–79.
84. See, e.g., Still v. Hopkins (In re Hopkins), 494 B.R. 306, 319–20 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
2013); Abercrombie v. Andrew Coll., 438 F. Supp. 2d 243, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Moss v. Moss,
175 P.3d 971, 974 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007).
85. See Hilterbrand v. Carter, 27 P.2d 1086, 1088–89 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY, § 51.03[3] (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2009).
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trust, even if the settlor, trustee, and beneficiary are all the same person.86
In the case of testamentary gifts, however, the property rights transfer at
death. Testamentary gifts generally occur through the laws of intestate succession, or via a validly executed will, and both entail the decedent’s retention of full property rights and complete control and dominion up until
death. 87 Because the property rights do not transfer during life in the case
of a testamentary gift, any instrument purporting to make a testamentary
gift is deemed to be fully revocable, leaving the decedent with complete
control over the property during life. The cost of that complete control during life, however, is the necessity of court-supervised probate.
This dichotomy between inter vivos and testamentary gifts is usually
simplified to the essential requirement that an inter vivos gift requires a present transfer of a property right or a contract right, while a testamentary
gift, in which the property rights transfer only at death, is effective only if
executed with the will formalities.88 But a number of modern estateplanning tools and mechanisms have arisen that challenge this binary structure. The most common is the revocable trust, wherein the settlor transfers
property into trust with the full power to revoke it at any time before his
death, and only if not revoked does the property transfer at the settlor’s
death to the beneficiaries. Because after-acquired property can be added to
the trust, as well as property pouring over from a will, and because the trust
is easily revocable, it is hard to imagine the revocable trust as a fully inter
vivos transfer. This is especially true when the trustee can revoke the trust
merely by alienating trust property or otherwise acting like an outright
owner and there are no fiduciary duties if the settlor is the trustee of a revocable trust. 89 The same is arguably true in the case of a life estate with a
remainder contingent on the life tenant not revoking the remainder. Only
when the life tenant dies without revoking is the remainderman assured of
enjoying the property. Even life insurance and POD and TOD designations
on bank and securities accounts seem testamentary in that they become ef-

86. See Di Maggio v. Petralia (In re Estate of Petralia), 204 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. 1965); Farkas v.
Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600, 603 (Ill. 1955); Ridge v. Bright, 93 S.E.2d 607, 610–13 (N.C. 1956);
Westerfeld v. Huckaby, 474 S.W.2d 189, 192–93 (Tex. 1972).
87. Katheleen R. Guzman, Intents and Purposes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 305, 329 n.91 (2011) (discussing how testamentary intent involves the intent to make a gift at death and not during life).
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1–.2
(AM. LAW INST. 2001); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Contracts and the Requirement of Consideration:
Positing a Unified Normative Theory of Contracts, Inter Vivos and Testamentary Gift Transfers,
91 N.D. L. REV. 547, 569–70 (2016); Gary, supra note 23, at 537; E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive
Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063,
1083 (1999).
89. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 601–604 (2000) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010).
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fective to transfer the property at the moment of death, although they are
considered at law to be non-testamentary (that is, inter vivos) transfers. 90
At some level, however, all of these will substitutes contain a limitation on the grantor’s control over the property. Thus, with the revocable
trust, the settlor must revoke the trust according to the terms of the trust
documents. 91 Similarly, the POD, TOD, and life insurance beneficiary designations can be revoked only through compliance with the terms of the
contract under which the property is held. 92 Even a contingent remainder
must be revoked according to whatever protocol is identified in the instrument creating the remainder.93 At a basic level, the property owner has
given up some modicum of legal control over the property to justify treating
its succession to designated beneficiaries as an inter vivos transfer and thus
not subject to the will formalities and probate administration. In all of these
will substitutes, the transferor’s ability to revoke is constrained by the instrument, enforceable by contract or trust law.
This is not true with the beneficiary deed.
The inter vivos/testamentary line disappears altogether in the case of the beneficiary
real-estate deed. Whether a donor uses an enhanced-life-estate deed and
retains the full right to revoke the remainder, or a statutory form TOD beneficiary deed, the donor purportedly gives up no property rights and yet, assuming the deed is not revoked, the beneficiary takes the property upon the
donor’s death without compliance with the will formalities. In the case of
many beneficiary deeds, the donor can simply transfer full ownership,
mortgage it, or otherwise exercise dominion and control over the property
during life, to effect a revocation. 94 So unlike the TOD securities account,
in which the beneficiary designation can be revoked only through filling out
the proper forms and delivering them to the account manager, the beneficiary deed can be revoked simply by doing some of the same things with
the property that one does as an outright owner. 95 Because no third party

90. See Miller, Part Two, supra note 14, at 705 (noting that the property transfer and formalities needed for will-substitutes, which do not require probate in large part because other areas of
law take over, and for which the law provides different formalities, make such inter vivos transfers more flexible).
91. See Heaps v. Heaps, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 239, 242–43 (Ct. App. 2004).
92. See, e.g., Masry v. Masry, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 915 (Ct. App. 2008); In re Schlicht, 329 P.3d
733 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014); Paul v. Arvidson, 123 P.3d 808 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005).
93. See In re Mergenhagen, 856 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390–91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
94. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 12 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009); Memorandum from Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 32, at 22–24.
95. For instance, the real property could be sold, partitioned, mortgaged, or deeded away
through the normal processes and those actions alone would result in a revocation of the beneficiary designation. The same is also true, to a certain extent, with money in a bank account, that
withdrawal of the funds would effectuate a revocation of any beneficiary designation on the account, the funds are still held subject to the rules and responsibilities of the bank.
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transfers the property pursuant to a contract from the donor to the beneficiary in the case of a beneficiary real-estate deed, the deed is self-executing
and functions more like a will than the other will substitutes. 96 Further,
since the power of revocation requires no different act than an outright
owner would do, the beneficiary deed more closely resembles a testamentary transfer than an inter vivos transfer—and some courts have so held. 97
Whether a beneficiary real-estate deed should be considered inter vivos or testamentary has both theoretical and functional consequences. To
the extent a beneficiary deed constitutes a testamentary transfer, it seems to
follow that it should require the will formalities and probate. Yet, most
states have formalities for the execution of real-estate deeds that, if not exactly identical to the will formalities, are similar enough to provide the
same protections against fraud that the will formalities are assumed to provide. 98 Thus, should we treat the beneficiary deed as testamentary just because no interest transfers during life, there is no contract, and the deed is
executed according to formalities that are essentially similar to the formalities for a will? Or do we treat the beneficiary deed as testamentary but excused from the will formalities altogether by statute? Or do we treat it as
inter vivos, in which case we either need to identify a present transfer of a
property interest (a contingent remainder, an executory interest, an expectancy)? Or do we treat it as inter vivos but excused from the presenttransfer requirement by statute? These are the kinds of questions that trusts
and estates professors contemplate and build into their exams to make their
students realize that those bright lines we try to teach are fuzzy guidelines
at best or arbitrary distinctions at worst.
This whole mental exercise brings into focus the question of whether
to retain the supposedly bright line between inter vivos and testamentary
gifts as we develop more effective estate-planning tools that enable a decedent to retain full control over property until death and still avoid probate.
The discussion below on powers of appointment argues against maintaining
the artificial distinction and suggests that to the extent we continue to retain
the bright line, with its significant legal consequences, we are likely to create more problems for donors than benefits. 99 A fuller discussion of this
point must wait, however, until we have explored the history and characteristics of the beneficiary deed and some of its variations.

96. It is self-executing in the sense that the grantor is in complete control of the property and
has full title during life, and at the grantor’s death no one has to perform any duty or act to transfer
the property to the beneficiary except the ministerial act of filing a new deed.
97. See Orth, supra note 69, at 465–68.
98. Memorandum from Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 32, at 5–6.
99. See infra Section IV.C.
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III. A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME: VARIETALS AND VARIATIONS ON
BENEFICIARY REAL-ESTATE DEEDS
As noted above, land has generally been subject to different rules than
personal property under the common law of succession. Since feudal times,
English landowners have contrived mechanisms to avoid the inconveniences of strict legal rules regarding the succession of real property. 100 To avoid
triggering the feudal incidents (essentially estate taxes) 101 that attached
when land descended by intestate succession, and to obtain the flexibility of
testamentary transfers in a world in which land could not by devised by a
will, landowners created complex inter vivos transfers and uses. 102 These
mechanisms depended on the strict legal distinctions between inter vivos
and testamentary transfers to obtain the relevant benefits. And these mechanisms continue to be used today, even though the dire consequences attendant upon inter vivos and testamentary transfers is less relevant in many
respects.
Thus, one mechanism was to hold land as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship. 103 At the death of the first co-owner, no feudal incidents
would accrue because the survivor had received an inter vivos interest in
the land when the joint tenancy was created. And if the survivor was quick
to re-transfer the land into another joint ownership before he died, joint tenancies could be used to avoid the feudal incidents for centuries, especially
with a multitude of joint tenants at one time. But joint tenancies had their
drawbacks, not least of which was the fact that the landowner had to transfer a partial interest in the land to the joint tenant, a transfer that was effective immediately. 104 If the original landowner then sought to sell, mortgage, or gift the land elsewhere, the joint tenant would have to agree. This
is because there had been a present inter vivos transfer of a half interest to
the joint tenant that was irrevocable without the joint tenant’s consent.
A second mechanism to avoid the feudal incidents was to transfer a
remainder interest and keep a life estate. 105 Upon the death of the life tenant, the right to possession of the land would shift automatically to the re100. DANAYA C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ESTATES AND FUTURE INTERESTS 1–18, 180–81
(2015).
101. The incidents of feudal seisin are too complex to discuss in detail here. But suffice it to
say that prior to the 1540 Statute of Wills, land had to pass either inter vivos or by intestacy.
When it passed by intestacy, the incidents of relief, primer seisin, and wardship might apply, all of
which were costly burdens on the estate that could ruin the estate. See BAKER, supra note 10, at
238–41.
102. Id. at 248–58.
103. Id. at 252.
104. See Orth, supra note 69, at 468.
105. See BAKER, supra note 10, at 280–85 (discussing fee tails and remainders as ways to accomplish family estate planning).
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mainderman(men). Like the joint tenancy, the life estate-and-remainder
avoided the feudal incidents, but it suffered from the same infirmities. The
landowner had to make a present transfer of the remainder interest to the
remainderman, who had to consent to the alienation of the land to others.
This avoided the incidents but did not resolve the problem of the inability to
make a will. The remainderman could not devise the remainder, so at every
generation the estate had to come back together into fee only to be split
again before the fee tenant died in possession. 106 The remainderman also
could sue for waste, prevent alienation, and effectively block many of a life
tenant’s decisions regarding use and management of the land.
The most common mechanism in the late medieval period was the
use, 107 whereby a landowner transferred the land to an entity that could not
die, or to a number of joint owners, upon the promise that they would hold
the land for the benefit of the landowner and then transfer the land as the
landowner requested. Notwithstanding the hiccup of the Statute of Uses of
1536, 108 which threatened to derail all uses, the use has become a key feature of estate planning today. Of course, today we call it a trust, and there
are certain critical elements necessary for a valid trust, like active duties,
arising as a result of Henry VIII’s attempt to crack his tenants’ tax avoidance schemes. 109 But the effect is essentially the same. A landowner
makes an inter vivos transfer of the land to a trustee who manages it subject
to certain fiduciary duties, complies with the trust terms, and eventually
transfers the land to the designated beneficiaries when the trust settlor
dies. 110 The irony, as John Baker explained, is that “it was foolish for any-

106. With both joint tenancies and life estates, problems arose if the parties died simultaneously and the land ended up passing to heirs by intestacy. If the remainderman died before the life
tenant, the life tenant needed to scramble to ensure that a successor remainderman was named if
the remainder had not already passed by intestacy to the remainderman’s heirs. But a landowner
didn’t want to name a whole host of possible remaindermen in case he later decided to sell the
land. All of the named remaindermen would need to consent to the sale. And once the remainderman had ownership of the land in fee simple, the whole process had to begin all over again. It
would not do, however, for a landowner to grant a remainder to an underage child if, when the
landowner died, the child was still underage and therefore not able to transfer it again because of
the child’s nonage. If the underage child died, intestacy happened and the feudal incidents would
be due. And even with the abolition of the feudal incidents in 1645, the disadvantages of the present transfer requirement were even greater with the adoption of the strict settlement. See id. at
280–96.
107. Id. at 248–57.
108. 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (Eng.).
109. See id. (establishing that active duties are required to prevent the use or trust from being
terminated under the Statute of Uses).
110. The use of trusts in the past was different than today. In the past, most uses were inter
vivos, designed to carry the property over the death of the grantor and get it passed to the successor, who then would execute a new use. After 1540, when wills could be made of real estate, and
especially after 1645, when wills for real estate could pass all of a decedent’s real property, testamentary trusts tended to be used to protect property passing to minors. Only in the twentieth cen-
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one to leave land vested in his own name. By vesting it in others he paradoxically became a more absolute owner than the common law allowed.” 111
Even with a trust, however, the landowner must make an inter vivos
transfer of title in the land to the trustee because even when the landowner
is also the trustee, a deed of transfer into the trust must be executed. And
today, for purposes of facilitating the smooth transmission of property,
trusts remain rather expensive compared to a simple will or a joint tenancy
deed. 112 And even if a trust is revocable, some legal duties constrain the
trustee, and the trust beneficiaries have certain enforceable legal rights that
accrue when land is transferred into trust. 113
The joint tenancy, the life estate, and the use each had the effect of
avoiding intestacy, which, in the medieval period, risked imposition of the
potentially devastating feudal incidents. Today, the tax differences between
inter vivos and testamentary transfers have generally been eliminated, only
to be replaced by probate implications. 114 All three mechanisms avoid probate and do not require a will executed with the formalities, but they do require giving up a present interest in the land. Holding on to the property
until death results in probate and requires a valid will, executed with the
tury has the inter vivos trust been revived primarily as a tax and probate avoidance and wealth
preservation tool after the imposition of the estate tax. BAKER, supra note 10, at 291–292.
111. Id. at 252–53.
112. Howard B. Solomon, Revocable Trusts—A Contrarian’s Viewpoint, N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb.
1996, at 34, 37 (explaining that trusts can be not only more expensive, but sometimes seem to be
recommended solely to make money for the attorneys).
113. The court explained in Farkas v. Williams:
[C]onsidering the terms of these instruments we believe Farkas did intend to presently
give Williams an interest in the property referred to. For it may be said, at the very
least, that upon his executing one of these instruments, he showed an intention to presently part with some of the incidents of ownership in the stock. Immediately after the
execution of each of these instruments, he could not deal with the stock therein referred
to the same as if he owned the property absolutely, but only in accordance with the
terms of the instrument.
....
It is not a valid objection to this to say that Williams would never question Farkas’
conduct, inasmuch as Farkas could then revoke the trust and destroy what interest Williams has. Such a possibility exists in any case where the settlor has the power of revocation. Still, Williams has rights the same as any beneficiary, although it may not be
feasible for him to exercise them. Moreover, it is entirely possible that he might in certain situations have a right to hold Farkas’ estate liable for breaches of trust committed
by Farkas during his lifetime.
125 N.E.2d 600, 603, 608 (Ill. 1955).
114. Not all differences have been eliminated, however. For instance, prior to 1976, the rates
of the gift tax and the estate tax were different, making very significant one’s decision to make an
inter vivos or a testamentary gift of property valued over the transfer tax threshold. Today the
rates are the same, but the gift tax is tax-exclusive and the estate tax is tax-inclusive. The gift tax
is ineligible for the step-up in basis, and recipients of testamentary gifts receive a step-up in basis
that beneficiaries of inter vivos gifts do not. See DANAYA C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION:
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 672–73 (2013).
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formalities if a donor wants the land to pass to a non-heir. Thus, even into
the twentieth century, donors continued to be faced with the inter vivos/testamentary problem of having to either transfer a present interest in
the land, with its attendant risks and potential loss of dominion, or use a
will and probate to retain complete control until death.
But the estate planning lawyers of today are just as clever as those medieval conveyancers who used the inter vivos/testamentary divide to craft
ways to avoid the feudal incidents. As will substitutes swept the field in the
late twentieth century, estate planners began to tinker with these commonlaw forms to achieve the probate-avoidance effect of life estates and joint
tenancies while giving up only a tiny sliver of a present interest. This was
accomplished by combining the power of revocation of trusts with the
good, old-fashioned life estate. 115 Thus, in order to avoid the presenttransfer problem, to ensure that the remainder designation would not become effective until death, and to gain the benefits of full revocability during life characteristic of a will, a donor transferred a revocable remainder
rather than a vested remainder to the transferee. This is called an enhancedlife-estate deed or a ladybird deed. The transferor retains a life estate and
all powers to manage and revoke, and transfers—it seems—only a contingent remainder that will take effect only if the life tenant does not otherwise
transfer the property to another prior to the life tenant’s death.
A. Creating and Adjusting the Common-Law Mechanisms
Florida was one of the first states to adapt the common law forms to
create an enhanced-life-estate type of transfer deed. It was prepared in
1982 by Florida estate planning and elder law attorney, Jerome Solkoff. 116
While this is one of the first traceable deeds in this form, the type of transfer was not a new phenomenon. 117 Commonly, the interest held by the life
tenant in an enhanced-life-estate deed is considered analogous to a life estate with a general power of appointment. 118 For over a century now, the
issue with this type of devise or grant has been whether the life tenant’s enhanced powers—specifically, the reservation of the absolute power of dis-

115. See generally Farkas, 125 N.E.2d 600; UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602 (2000) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N, amended 2010). After the 1536 passage of the Statute of Uses, contingent remainders
were more durable, and executory interests were recognized at law, both of which are interests
that could be used in this context. See also WRIGHT, supra note 100, at 87–88.
116. Kary C. Frank, The Search for the Lady Bird Deed, 34 MICH. PROB. & EST. PLAN. J. 25,
26 (2015).
117. Kary C. Frank, Ladybird Deeds Purposes and Usefulness, 95 MICH. B.J. 30, 31 (2016).
118. Patricia P. Jones, Attorney’s Title Insurance Fund, Inc., Transfers into Trusts and Related
Issues (May 17, 2002) (unpublished materials distributed at Broward County Bar meeting),
https://www.browardbar.org/wp-content/uploads/staleymemorial/SpeakerLeonardEMondschein/Lady-Bird-Deed-Presentation_42-pages.pdf.
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position—operate to enlarge the traditional life estate interest of the life
tenant to a fee interest. 119 In other words, if a life estate deed reserves to the
life tenant the absolute power to deed the property in fee, courts have grappled with whether the life tenant only has a life estate interest and the remainderman has some interest or a fee interest where the remainderman has
nothing. 120 But as with all powers of appointment, the default takers have
contingent remainders that enable them to take if the power is not exercised. This remainder interest suggests that the present estate holder only
has a life estate and not a fee interest, despite the fact that the Restatement
(Third) of Property and the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) treat a life estate with a general power as ownership equivalent. 121 Because the traditional life estate deed has evolved by creative legal mechanisms through the
common law to include the reservation of these added powers, the answers
to these questions are not clear and often vary state by state or, in some instances, case by case. 122
As to the life tenant’s interest, the majority rule holds that where a life
estate is coupled with an unlimited or absolute power to dispose of the fee
interest of the property, the life estate interest is not enlarged or transformed
into a fee or absolute interest. 123 Accordingly, the minority rule holds that
119. H. C. J., Annotation, Absolute Power of Disposition in Life Tenant as Elevating Life Estate to Fee, 36 A.L.R. 1177 (1925) (discussing case law prior to 1925 dealing with the issue of life
estate deeds that reserve the absolute power of disposition of the fee interest to the life tenant); see
Cowman v. Classen, 156 Md. 428, 144 A. 367, 371 (1929) (“Now, it is quite clear, upon all the
authorities, that where an estate is given to a person generally or indefinitely, with power of disposition, such gift carries the entire estate; and the devisee or legatee takes, not a simple power,
but the property absolutely. But where the property is given . . . to a person expressly for life, and
there be annexed to such gift a power of disposition of the reversion, there the rule is different,
and the first taker, in such case, takes but an estate for life, with the power annexed; and if the person so taking fails to execute the power and thus dispose of the reversion, it goes, where there is
no gift or devise over, to the heir or next of kin of the testator, according to the nature of the property. This distinction, while it has been said to be a refined one, is, nevertheless, as well established as any in the law; and judges and text-writers alike recognize and adopt it as a principle too
firmly settled to be questioned.” (quoting Benesch v. Clark, 49 Md. 497, 504 (1878))); John A.
Facey, III et al., “Top Ten” Pitfalls in Preparing Lady Bird Johnson Deeds, VT. B.J., Winter
2008/2009, at 42, 42.
120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 22.3
cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2011) (referring to life estates with general powers of appointment as
“ownership equivalent” interests).
121. Id. See also I.R.C. § 2056(5) (2012).
122. See H. C. J., supra note 119 (“[I]n a few jurisdictions there are some cases which are apparently in conflict. This, however, is not due to any real inconsistency among the decisions of
such jurisdictions, but to the well-known characteristic of will cases, viz., that each case is a law
unto itself and is decided so as to give effect, if possible, to the testator’s intention as disclosed by
the various provisions and expressions of the instrument and the circumstances of the parties.”);
see also J.V.D., Annotation, Absolute Power of Disposition in Life Tenant as Elevating Life Estate
to Fee, 76 A.L.R. 1153 (1932) (citing related cases therein).
123. 1 TIFFANY REAL PROP. § 56 (3d ed. 1970); see also H. C. J., supra note 119 (analyzing
thoroughly the historical cases across numerous jurisdictions that have adopted the majority rule).
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“where an absolute power of disposition, either express or implied, is added
to a life estate in real property, the life estate is thereby enlarged to a
fee.” 124 While the majority view that a life estate interest with the enhanced
power to sell or transfer fee seems legally inconsistent, most courts have
determined otherwise. 125
Opinions differ as to what interest the remainderman or beneficiaries
have when an enhanced-life-estate deed is executing and continuing
through the duration of the life tenants’ lifetime. Some cases have held that
where a life estate reserved the absolute power of disposal in the life tenant,
the gift over to the remainderman at the death of the life tenant was actually
void. 126 However, all jurisdictions that once held this view have resolved
that the remainder that follows is valid.127 The beneficiary or remainder interest resulting from an enhanced-life-estate deed has been referred to as a
vested remainder subject to total divestment, 128 but it has also been categorized as a contingent remainder or possibly just an expectancy interest.129
Whether we identify the remainder interest as vested or contingent
does in fact matter for certain purposes, despite the aversion most first year
law students have to the subject.130 A vested remainder would normally be
considered a part of the remainderman’s estate if the remainderman prede-

124. H. C. J., supra note 119; see e.g., Waller v. Sproles, 22 S.W.2d 4 (Tenn. 1929) (obiter);
Vandeventer v. McMullen, 11 S.W.2d 867 (Tenn. 1928); Ogden v. Maxwell, 140 S.E. 554 (W.
Va. 1927); Wiant v. Lynch, 140 S.E. 487 (W. Va. 1927); Blake v. Blake, 115 S.E. 794 (W. Va.
1923) (applying the rule to personal property only).
125. Gaylord v. Goldblatt, 423 So.2d 203, 204 (Ala. 1982).
126. 3 SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1488 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing
how this position was the minority position and how the legislature has enacted legislation to
seemingly bring their states in line with the majority position).
127. Id.
128. See Frank, supra note 117, at 31 (referencing a definition provided by Gerry W. Beyer,
Governor Preston E. Smith Regents, Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law);
Suzanne M. Barry, Enhanced Life Estates Deed Growing in Popularity, 9 IN THE TITLE CORNER,
1, 4 (2006).
129. Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600, 603 (Ill. 1955) (calling the future interest of a remainderman in a revocable trust an expectancy interest).
130. Stephen Mackey states:
A vested remainder and a vested remainder subject to divestment are actual estates in
property. A remainder is vested if there is a present right to future possession even
though that present right may be eliminated by some future event. When a present right
may be eliminated by the occurrence of some future contingency, then that remainder is
vested subject to divestment.
Alternatively, a contingent remainder takes effect on the occurrence of an event that
may or may not occur prior to the termination of the preceding estate. With a vested
remainder there is uncertainty as to whether the estate will even be enjoyed in possession. With a contingent remainder, the right to the actual estate is uncertain.
Stephen L. Mackey, Fund Insures Enhanced Life Estates: Fund Insurability of Life Estate Deeds
with Enhanced Powers in the Life Estate Holders Results in Better Tricks from an Old Dog!, THE
FUND CONCEPT (Attorneys’ Title Fund Servs., LLC , Orlando, Fla.), Aug. 1999, at 124, 124.

2019]

TEARING DOWN THE WALL

535

ceased the life tenant and would therefore be available for elective share
purposes or to creditors of the remainderman. If a vested remainder subject
to divestment passed to the remainderman, then the remainderman’s death
before the life tenant would not cause the gift to lapse. A contingent remainder designed to vest only if the remainderman survives the life tenant
would lapse if the remainderman predeceased the life tenant. While we
would assume that most life tenants of an enhanced-life-estate deed would
re-execute a new deed upon the remainderman’s death, we all know that
such actions are not always feasible or likely. If the life tenant and the remainderman died simultaneously, the remainderman’s estate might take the
real property if the remainderman held a vested remainder, but would take
nothing if it was a contingent remainder. 131
But expectancies, such as the rights of beneficiaries in revocable
trusts 132 or the interests of takers in default under a power of appointment,
wax and wane with state-law interpretations of their status as property
rights. Like the common law’s historical aversion to contingent remainders, certain property rights are deemed so evanescent that, like old King
Hamlet, they only appear real at midnight during a full moon.
The expectancy interest is presumably a type of really-contingent remainder that is, of course, not recognized by traditional future-interests law.
The problem that arises in any case using a life estate-and-remainder mechanism, however, is that some property interest does in fact need to transfer
to the remainderman during life, whether we call it a vested remainder, a
contingent remainder, an expectancy interest, a lottery ticket, or something
else. That transfer is technically inter vivos and has some value to the remainderman or the remainderman’s estate. Possessing a lottery ticket is
clearly better than having no lottery ticket at all. This means that, under
certain circumstances, the remainderman’s estate may include the remainder and it may be available to the creditors of the remainderman. But because a future interest transfers to the beneficiary, and the life tenant does
not retain an absolute fee, this form of real-estate deed clearly falls on the
inter vivos side of the juridical binary.
However, problems with the life estate-and-remainder mechanism can
become quite complex when used by joint owners. In a case in Florida,
Brock v. Willhoite, 133 the issue of revocability triggered a legal challenge
131. If the remainder beneficiary’s interest is considered vested at the time of the enhancedlife-estate deed, then the remainder beneficiary’s interest will pass to the remainder beneficiary’s
heirs or devisees. See In re Estate of Martin, 110 So.2d 421, 422–23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
However, if the remainder beneficiary’s interest is considered contingent, then title will not pass
to the remainder beneficiary’s estate. See Travis v. Ashton, 23 So.2d 725, 726–27 (Fla. 1945).
132. Farkas, 125 NE.2d 600.
133. 227 So.3d 596, No. 5D16-1925, 2017 WL 2493584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 6, 2017)
(unpublished table decision). Certain descriptions and footnotes from Stephanie Emrick’s article,
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that points right to the concerns we have with beneficiary deeds. 134 In this
case, the grantors, an unmarried couple, previously held the property as
joint tenants with rights of survivorship. 135 The grantors later executed a
quitclaim deed 136 to themselves for life, and upon the death of both grantors, the remainder was to pass one-half to his trust and one-half to her
trust. 137 However, the grantors did not include in the deed the form of tenancy in which they would hold the property for the remainder of their lifetime. 138 Following the first grantor’s death, the surviving grantor revoked
the deed and conveyed the full fee simple title of the property to herself,
with the intent to wholly divest the remainder trusts of any interest.139 The
children of the deceased grantor—who were the beneficiaries of his trust—
filed suit alleging that the surviving grantor did not have the right to convey
the full fee simple title to the property wholly to herself because she only
had a life estate interest in one-half of the property. 140
The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal sidestepped the revocability
issue by determining that the enhanced-life-estate deed would be construed
in light of Florida’s statute establishing that tenancies in common are the
default if no other form of tenancy is specified. 141 Because the court ruled
that the couple held the life estates as tenants in common, the remainder-

Transfer on Death Deeds: It Is Time to Establish the Rules of the Game, 70 FLA. L. REV. 469
(2018), are reprinted throughout the discussion of Brock v. Willhoite with the permission of the
Florida Law Review.
134. See Brief for Appellant, Brock v. Willhoite, 227 So.3d 596 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 29,
2016) (No. 5D16-1925), 2016 WL 6403914, at 2.
135. Id. at 4.
136. Quitclaim deeds are routinely used when transferors wish to add someone’s name to a
deed, to change the form or quantity of ownership interests, or to clear up defects in title.
137. The conveyance language of the Quitclaim Deed stated:
[T]o the same LEROY TURNER, a single man . . . and NANCY S. BROCK, a single
woman . . . for and during their lifetimes, without any liability for waste, and with full
power and authority in said life tenants to sell, convey, mortgage, encumber, lease (including a lease for a term exceeding the life estate) or otherwise manage and dispose of
the property described herein, in fee simple, with or without consideration, without
joinder of the remainder person, and with full power and authority to retain any and all
proceeds or rentals generated thereby, and upon the deaths of LEROY TURNER and
NANCY S. BROCK, remainder in fee simple unto the acting Trustee of THE LEROY
TURNER TRUST, dated June 22, 2011, as to an undivided one-half interest, and unto
the acting Trustee of THE NANCY S. BROCK REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST, dated
February 19, 2004, as to an undivided one-half interest, as Tenants-in-Common.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 134, at 4.
138. Under Florida law, co-owners of real property are presumed to be tenants in common.
The operative language of the statute states: “[T]ransfer or conveyance heretofore or hereafter
made to two or more shall create a tenancy in common, unless the instrument creating the estate
shall expressly provide for the right of survivorship.” FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (2018).
139. Brief for Appellant, supra note 134, at 6.
140. Id.
141. FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (2018).

2019]

TEARING DOWN THE WALL

537

men prevailed; 142 but if the court had held it as a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship, which is how the property was held before the enhanced-lifeestate deed was executed, presumably the surviving grantor would have
prevailed. 143 The real question facing the Florida court was whether the life
tenants–joint grantors intended to create joint life estates, with the survivor
taking the entire life estate until her death, with the full power to revoke, or
whether they intended to each have a life estate in their own half, and at the
death of each that remainder would vest. What makes the case so difficult
is that the right of survivorship of a joint tenancy is inconsistent with a life
estate; but a tenancy in common, which is the default form of co-ownership,
is inconsistent with the idea of full revocability that characterizes the enhanced-life-estate deed. The problem illustrated by this case is that when
deeds are customizable, as in those states that permit enhanced-life-estate
deeds, drafting must be done very carefully.
Because the enhanced-life-estate deed is relatively new and has not
been litigated extensively, the drafting principles for estate planning lawyers are simply not clear. The lawyers who drafted the enhanced-life-estate
deed in Brock v. Willhoite seemingly failed to contemplate the possibility
that the surviving life tenant would revoke and cause the children of the deceased life tenant to lose all interest, passing the entire property to her own
children. If this property had been held in trust, the outcome would have
been much simpler. Each settlor would be entitled to the life income and
full use of the trust corpus, but the trust would become irrevocable upon the
death of the first settlor. The presumption of irrevocability upon the death
of the first settlor protects the interests of the beneficiaries, especially in the
case of blended families where the children of the first settlor to die could
otherwise be easily divested of any trust interest by the surviving settlor’s
power to revoke.
The Brock case illustrates one of our concerns with the Uniform Act,
which provides that all TOD deeds are fully revocable up until the last colife tenant dies. 144 And it highlights why enhanced-life-estate deeds that
don’t have the benefit of uniform rules of construction can be problematic.
Because each state that recognizes the enhanced-life-estate deed through
common law has shaped its law through historic (and some more recent)
cases, the terminology and definitions have become diverse and inconsistent. 145 The case also points to the tension between many state’s probate
142. See Final Judgement ¶ 2, Willhoite v. Brock, No. 2014-CA-000640 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 12,
2016), aff’d, 227 So.3d 596, No 5D16-1925, 2017 WL 2493584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 6, 2017)
(unpublished table decision).
143. See Brock, 2017 WL 2493584.
144. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
145. For instance, Arizona refers to beneficiary deeds as “beneficiary deeds,” ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33-405 (2014), Vermont refers to them as “ladybird deeds” or “enhanced life estate
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codes and their real property codes. Probate codes tend to establish defaults
to protect the living, like children and spouses, while property codes establish defaults to make real property marketable, to remove outstanding contingencies, and to settle title disputes in ways that maintain the integrity of
the title and recording system. 146
B. Legislative Recognition 147
As the popularity of enhanced-life-estate deeds continued to grow,
states began to respond by enacting legislation that permitted the execution
of TOD deeds. The first state to enact specific legislation was Missouri in
1989 as a part of its Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri. 148 Nearly a
decade later, numerous other states began to follow suit. 149 In 2007, the
Uniform Law Commission formed a drafting committee with the goal of
producing a Uniform Transfer on Death for Real Property Act. 150 While
the drafting committee was working on producing the proposed uniform
law, Montana, 151 Oklahoma, 152 Minnesota, 153 and Indiana 154 enacted their
own forms of legislation, bringing the total number of states with independent legislation to thirteen. 155

deeds,” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 321 (2018), and Indiana refers to them as “transfer-on-death
deeds.” IND. CODE ANN. § 32-17-14-3 (West 2015). See also People v. Cooper, No. 333828,
2018 WL 384013 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2018) (referring to them as “ladybird deeds”).
146. State probate codes provide primarily for the succession of property at death and therefore make provisions for minor children, surviving spouses, creditors, and other survivors who
might have been dependent on the decedent for support. The UPC accomplishes this through
complicated elective share statutes, family allowance and homestead, and protections for pretermitted spouses and children. State property codes provide for the smooth transmission of property, usually real property, by providing default interpretations for ambiguous terms, cut-offs and
statutes of limitations for enforcing outstanding reversionary interests, and recording procedures
to reduce claims.
147. Certain descriptions and footnotes from Stephanie Emrick’s article, Transfer on Death
Deeds: It Is Time to Establish the Rules of the Game, 70 FLA. L. REV. 469 (2018), are reprinted
throughout this subsection with the permission of the Florida Law Review. See id at 484–88.
148. See MO. REV. STAT. § 461.025 (1989)).
149. In 1997, Kansas adopted legislation, followed by Ohio in 2000, New Mexico in 2001,
Arizona in 2002, Nevada in 2003, Colorado in 2004, Arkansas in 2005, and Wisconsin in 2006.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-405 (2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-12-608 (2015); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-15-401(1) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3501 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.109
(2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-6-401 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5302.22 (LexisNexis
2016); WIS. STAT. § 705.15 (2016).
150. See generally Memorandum from Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 32 (produced in response to the ULC’s appointment of a committee to construct a uniform law).
151. MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-121 (2015).
152. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 1253 (2014).
153. MINN. STAT. § 507.071 (2014).
154. IND. CODE § 32-17-14-11 (2016).
155. See Emrick, supra note 4, at 484.
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The drafting committee carefully looked at the legislation each state
had then adopted, in addition to the comprehensive study completed by the
California Law Revision Commission, to identify the major issues and
compare the relevant statutory language from each.156 The drafting committee identified issues that it wished to address in the final uniform act, 157
including execution formalities and the effect of co-ownership with right of
survivorship; 158 the rights of the transferor, 159 of the beneficiary, 160 of family members, 161 of creditors, 162 and of third-party purchasers; 163 and taxation, 164 Medicaid eligibility and reimbursement, 165 and the procedural requirements of implementation of the revocable TOD deed. 166 The drafting
committee met and consulted with a variety of experts in the field before
finalizing the URPTODA at the ULC’s 2009 Annual Meeting. 167 The prefatory note concludes that “[t]he time is ripe for a Uniform Act to facilitate
this emerging form of nonprobate transfer and to bring uniformity and clarity to its use and operation.” 168 More importantly, through the statute states
could permit true TOD deeds that are not some form of enhanced life estate
that might be found to effectuate a present transfer of a remainder interest. 169
While there are too many details in the URPTODA to discuss at
length, a few points are worth noting. Besides introducing clear definitions
for the terminology used in connection with this form of transfer of real
property, 170 Section 5 explicitly provides that the transfer of property via a
TOD deed is “effective at the transferor’s death.” 171 However, Section 7
states that a “transfer on death deed is nontestamentary,” which presumably
is necessary to make clear that a TOD deed need not be executed with the
156. Memorandum from Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 32, at 4–66.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 4–20.
159. Id. at 20–30.
160. Id. at 31–49.
161. Id. at 50–51.
162. Id. at 52–53.
163. Id. at 56–57.
164. Id. at 57–58.
165. Id. at 58–59.
166. Id. at 59–66.
167. See Real Property Transfer on Death Act: Committee Archive, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/committee-archive-28?CommunityKey=a4be2b9b5129-448a-a761-a5503b37d884&tab=librarydocuments (last visited Mar. 30, 2019) (listing agendas, memos, drafts, and other Drafting Committee documents).
168. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT, prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2009).
169. See Emrick, supra note 4, at 484–85.
170. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
171. Id. § 5.
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formalities of a will, nor does a TOD deed need to be probated. 172 Thus,
like any TOD designation, the TOD real-estate deed takes effect at death
but is treated as non-testamentary (that is, as an inter vivos transfer), even
though no present interests transfer to the beneficiary and there is no third
party trustee or account holder. 173
For purposes of determining the legal effectiveness of a TOD deed, a
statute like the URPTODA can override the common-law binary of either
requiring a present transfer of an interest or execution with the will formalities. But declaring the deed to be effective does not solve many of the ancillary issues like those raised in Brock 174 or issues surrounding enforceability of revocation constraints or anti-lapse.
Further, the URPTODA specifies that “[a] transfer on death deed is
revocable even if the deed or another instrument contains a contrary provision.” 175 The prefatory note explains that “[d]uring the owner’s lifetime,
the beneficiaries have no interest in the property, and the owner retains full
power to transfer or encumber the property or to revoke the TOD deed.” 176
The Comment to Section 6 clarifies that even if the transferor includes a
promise in the TOD deed that the deed will be irrevocable, the deed remains revocable, and recourse must be sought under other law if a transferor revokes a deed that expressly states will be irrevocable. 177 Section 12
unequivocally resolves the question of who has what interest at what time.
So long as the transferor is alive, a TOD deed does not affect the interest or
right of any of the parties involved, nor does it affect eligibility for public
assistance, and the designated beneficiary does not have any interest in the
property—either legal or equitable—so creditors of the designated beneficiary cannot attach the property. 178
Since the promulgation of the URPTODA, several states have replaced
previous legislation with the URPTODA; however, other states have enacted legislation that differs from the Uniform Act. 179 And seventeen states

172. Id. § 7.
173. See Emrick, supra note 4, at 485–86.
174. See supra notes 133–143 and accompanying text.
175. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
176. Id. prefatory note.
177. Id. § 6 CMT.
178. Id. § 12; see Emrick, supra note 4, at 485–86.
179. In 2011, Nevada repealed previous legislation and enacted the URPTODA. NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 111.655 (LexisNexis 2016). Oklahoma had legislation prior to the URPTODA but
introduced the URPTODA to the legislature in 2010. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 1253 (West
2016); H.R. 3103, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010). In 2009, Indiana adopted a comprehensive
Transfer on Death Property Act that includes a section specifically dealing with Transfer on Death
Deeds. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-17-14-11 (LexisNexis 2016). And in 2015, Massachusetts introduced legislation that differed from the URPTODA. H.R. 1565, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2015).
Interestingly, Mississippi introduced legislation in 2016, to adopt the URPTODA, S. 2736, 2016
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currently do not recognize a beneficiary deed through common law or
through enacted legislation. 180 However, that does not mean that those
states have not contemplated the idea. Since the URPTODA’s appearance,
several states that do not currently recognize the beneficiary deed—or some
form thereof—have introduced legislation that has not been enacted, including Alabama, 181 Connecticut, 182 Maryland, 183 and Utah. 184 In addition to
legislators introducing bills, practitioners have called for using beneficiary
deeds in an effort to simplify the estate planning process. 185
Even a quick review of the law in the many states that have some process for creating a beneficiary designation in real estate shows the vast diversity of treatment of the beneficiary form of deed. 186 This diversity has
created confusion and controversy around the functional and practical legal
effect of using a beneficiary deed. Moreover, the terminology, technical
requirements, revocability, and operation vary from state to state. 187 For the
states that recognize the use of beneficiary deeds, such deeds have become
a common device for practitioners to accomplish transfers of real property
at death in the same manner previously only reserved for personal property
assets. However, the lack of jurisprudence and inconsistent statutory
schemes has led to confusion and uncertainty for legal practitioners and
their clients. For the beneficiary deed to emerge in common usage as a
successful estate planning tool, it is important that each state enact clear
legislation that will define and establish the rules of the game. In the next
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016), but also introduced legislation that differed from the URPTODA in 2016,
S. 2068, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016), and again in 2017, H.R. 806, 2017 Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2017). However, perhaps the most interesting legislation that differs from the URPTODA is in
Ohio where the legislature amended the prior law to allow for the transfer of real property at death
through an affidavit. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.22 (LexisNexis 2016); see also Riehle, supra
note 46, at 2 (analyzing Minnesota’s current transfer-on-death deed statute).
180. As of 2018, the following states do recognize transfer-on-death deeds—or some form
thereof—as a matter of law: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont. See Emrick, supra note 4, at 487 n.171.
181. H.R. 406, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2016).
182. S. 1162, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013); S. 117, Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn.
2016).
183. H.D. 946, 2013 Leg., 433d Sess. (Md. 2013); H.D. 59, 2014 Leg., 434th Sess. (Md.
2014); H.D. 186, 2015 Leg., 435th Sess. (Md. 2015).
184. H.R. 224, 2010 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010); H.R. 199, 2016 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016); H.D. 14,
2017 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017).
185. See Tyler H. Gablenz, Simplify the Process: Why Connecticut Should Adopt the Use of
Transfer-on-death Deeds, 28 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 165, 165 (2015); Michael A. Kirtland &
Catherine Anne Seal, Beneficiary Deeds and Estate Planning, 66 ALA. LAW. 118, 118 (2005); see
also see Emrick, supra note 4, at 487.
186. See Memorandum from Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 32, at 4–20 (comparing the different state laws regarding different operational issues).
187. See PALOMAR, supra note 49, § 333 (discussing generally the various ways that states
handle the transfer-on-death deed, or some form thereof).
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Section, we want to draw attention to a couple of unfortunate situations
where we think the ULC went astray in the Uniform Act.
Ultimately, the URPTODA may bring clarity, but in some cases it
does so at the expense of donative intent. And it may unnecessarily lead to
some unintended consequences. In our opinion, the revocability and creditor questions highlight the fundamental flaw of trying to fit the TOD realestate deed into the inter vivos/testamentary binary, a binary that has been
rejected by the tax code and probably should be rejected in the property
world of succession law as well.
IV. HICCUPS WITH THE URPTODA AND OTHER VARIETIES OF THE
BENEFICIARY DEED
Although we agree that the true TOD form real-estate deed is an excellent innovation in estate planning, and that a uniform statute is a good way
to avoid many of the idiosyncrasies of diverse state laws, we want to voice
a few concerns. On the one hand, because of the variety of mechanisms for
achieving a TOD effect in real estate, there can be very real and very serious differences in results depending on state law. Thus, while a beneficiary’s creditors may have no rights to property in a TOD deed under the
URPTODA, they might have access to property under an enhanced-lifeestate deed where the beneficiary is deemed to hold a vested remainder subject to divestment. Similarly, anti-lapse statutes might apply in cases of a
TOD deed but not an enhanced-life-estate deed if the beneficiary–
remainderman predeceases the transferor. We discuss some of these issues
below. But more importantly, the formalistic distinctions between inter vivos and testamentary transfers, between wills and will substitutes, as they
operate through these problematic issues of lapse, creditors rights, and revocability, may cause even more disparate outcomes that do not match the
intentions of transferors or the promises of estate planning professionals
who hope that beneficiary deeds will provide a powerful and beneficial tool
to the modest estate plan.
In discussing a few of the ways in which the different deed mechanisms may result in different results, we also point to how the formalistic
division between inter vivos and testamentary transfers gets in the way of
the promises of TOD deeds. Nearly thirty years ago, Professor Doug Miller
advocated for “[a] unified approach to formalities of transfer” to “eliminate
the need to maintain the juridical fiction of the ‘present interest’ test as a
justification for treating the will substitutes as valid transfers despite their
noncompliance with the wills acts.” 188 He argued that “[a]bolishing the
statute of wills in favor of a flexible provision addressing the consequences
188. Miller, Part Two, supra note 14, at 718.
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of a transferor’s compliance with ‘alternative formality’ would effectively
eliminate the need for distinguishing the standard of formality for wills and
will substitutes.” 189 It seems to us that the TOD real-estate deed fundamentally challenges the binary between inter vivos and testamentary transfers.
This occurs not only with the URPTODA’s incoherent provisions that no
property rights transfer until death but the deed is declared to be nontestamentary, but with the past thirty years of legal contortions necessary to
maintain some illusive allegiance to a fictional divide that is so full of holes
it has virtually no meaning.
By looking at issues of revocability, lapse, powers of appointment,
creditors rights, homestead, and future interests in the context of the different mechanisms existing across the states, we can see distinctly how the juridical binary and the meaningless formalities ultimately frustrate intent,
undermine effectiveness of the TOD mechanism, and result in unanticipated
consequences.
A. Revocability
Section 6 of the URPTODA provides that a “transfer on death deed is
revocable even if the deed or another instrument contains a contrary provision.” 190 Commentary to the URPTODA states that the reason revocability
is mandatory is to “prevent[] an off-record instrument from affecting the
revocability of a transfer on death deed” and to “protect[] the transferor
who may wish later to revoke the deed.” 191
Although the goal of the ULC was to make the URPTODA mimic the
revocability of other will substitutes, especially POD and TOD accounts,
the aspect of mandatory revocability may be contrary to the wishes of many
transferors, especially in the context of jointly held property. Thus, an individual who owns Blackacre outright in fee simple and executes a TOD
deed to have it pass to a favored child or niece at death will certainly want
the deed to be revocable. Without revocability, it does not look like a TOD
deed, but rather like a life estate with an absolutely vested remainder. Thus,
revocability makes sense in order to maintain the bright line distinction that
no property rights transfer to the beneficiary until the transferor’s death so
the transferor has maximum control.
The case is much more complex when the land is jointly held, as the
diversity of state laws attests. 192 And differences between how the land is
jointly held also can matter, as between tenancies in common, joint tenan-

189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
Id.
See Memorandum from Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 32, at 24.
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cies, tenancies by the community, or tenancies by the entirety. And the
state variation reveals that full revocability has not been fully embraced. In
California, the TOD is void if the transferor holds title in joint tenancy, although this provision was only added in 2015. 193 Prior to that time, the
TOD deed severed a joint tenancy so that the death of one co-owner passed
that owner’s share to the beneficiary, who then took as a tenant in common
with the surviving co-tenant. 194 In Missouri and Wisconsin, a joint-tenancy
beneficiary deed must be revoked by all joint tenants, while a tenancy in
common can be revoked by any single co-tenant. 195 Ironically, although
most states treat the right of survivorship as trumping the beneficiary designation of the TOD, California originally held otherwise. In California, if
co-tenants executed a TOD deed and one died, the deceased tenant’s portion passed to the beneficiaries, who held as tenants in common with the
surviving co-tenant. 196 California has since repealed this provision, which
we believe is closer to the outcome of a jointly settled trust than the full
revocability mandated by the URPTODA.
One can imagine situations in which full revocability would be desirable, and others in which non-revocability would be desirable. For example,
consider a married couple who executes a beneficiary deed naming their
children as beneficiaries. After the death of the first tenant, the survivor
might need expensive cancer treatment and decides to revoke and sell the
property. This power to revoke is most likely what the couple would have
wanted. On the other hand, recall the case of Brock v. Willhoite, 197 in
which an unmarried couple executed an enhanced-life-estate deed that allowed them to retain full powers to revoke, transfer, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber the property, but at their deaths the property was to pass half to
his trust and half to hers. Upon his death, the surviving co-tenant attempted
to revoke the entire deed, thus divesting the interests of the deceased cotenant’s trust beneficiaries. Had the property been placed in a revocable
trust, the surviving co-tenant most likely would not have been able to revoke the share passing to the children of the deceased co-tenant because, in
the case of most revocable trusts, the death of the first settlor causes the
trust to become irrevocable. Under the URPTODA’s mandatory revocability, the surviving co-tenant can fully revoke the deed, as the survivor did
with the enhanced-life-estate deed in Brock.
One possible way to address some undesirable outcomes would be to
make revocability the default in cases of individually held property, but that
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

CAL. PROB. CODE § 5664 (West 2016).
See CAL. PROB. CODE § 5662 (repealed).
MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.033(1) (West 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 705.15(3) (West 2016).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 5662 (repealed).
See supra notes 134–143 and accompanying text.
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in the case of jointly held property, a default of non-revocability would apply unless the parties expressly state otherwise. This would correspond to
the way most revocable trusts operate when there are multiple settlors and
would protect the interests of beneficiaries in blended families where revocable trusts and joint-beneficiary deeds are highly recommended.
But even individuals ought to be able to build non-revocability into
their deeds under certain circumstances. 198 Although there might be better
ways of managing things, a property settlement at divorce could easily use
a beneficiary deed rather than an unenforceable contract to make a will or
complex provisions of the property settlement agreement to protect the interests of children and preclude a second marriage disinheriting those children, if the deed were non-revocable. 199 Although non-revocability would
constitute a restraint on alienation, that restraint would be no greater than
one created by giving away a vested remainder.
Although the enhanced-life-estate deed and the TOD deed both tend to
be revocable and, therefore, their differences in that regard are minimal
when the transferors seek to revoke, the differences can be significant when
we consider whether the beneficiary has received any expectancy interest
inter vivos. In the well-known case of Farkas v. Williams, 200 which appears
in nearly every trusts and estates casebook, the Supreme Court of Illinois
explained that the property right the beneficiary received in a revocable
trust was the right to enforce the trust’s revocability provisions against the
settlor-trustee’s estate. 201 In the case of life insurance or a POD designation
in a securities account, the owner of the account must revoke the beneficiary designation in conformity with rules established by the account’s
manager for the revocation to be effective. 202 In the case of a revocable
trust, beneficiaries can enforce the provisions of the trust and hold a trust
settlor’s estate accountable if the trust is not revoked according to the appropriate terms. 203 But would a beneficiary of a beneficiary deed be entitled to enforce any breach of the revocability mechanism if there is no present interest transfer of the right to enforce? That right to enforce is
deemed to be a significant property right even if there are practical limitations on the beneficiary’s ability to exercise the power during the transfer-

198. Non-revocability could be used for charitable giving when a Charitable Remainder Trust
is too expensive.
199. Of course, we understand that non-revocability essentially would create a life estate with
an absolutely vested remainder, with all of the negatives that go along with that.
200. 125 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 1955).
201. Id. at 607.
202. John Langbein, Destructive Federal Preemption of State Wealth Transfer Law in Beneficiary Designation Cases: Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1668
(2014).
203. Heaps v. Heaps, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 239, 295 (Ct. App. 2004).
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or’s life. 204 To the extent the URPTODA holds that the TOD deed is nontestamentary, one would assume that an interest transferred inter vivos, and
that that interest consists, at the very least, of the ability to enforce the terms
of revocation. But in that regard, the TOD deed, and certainly not the enhanced-life-estate deed, is not the functional equivalent to a will.
One of the reasons for the URPTODA’s insistence on revocability is
that the ULC treats the TOD deed like a functional will, fully revocable until death. That makes sense if no property rights transfer until death of the
transferor. But it is contrary to the express articulation that the TOD is not
testamentary. If it is not testamentary, then it is presumably inter vivos; but
if it is inter vivos then some present interest would normally be deemed to
have passed. Revocability is not inconsistent with either an inter vivos or a
testamentary characterization, but it could matter in the context of antilapse, as discussed below.
A TOD deed is similar to a lottery ticket. If the ticket passes inter vivos, then the beneficiary has ownership of the ticket and can redeem it if
the ticket wins. But most importantly, it can only be voided by failure to
comply with the lottery rules. If no interest passes inter vivos, then the
beneficiary is more like the first person standing in line to buy a theater
ticket outside the closed box office. If the box office never opens, because
the transferor revokes the TOD deed, the beneficiary has no grounds to
complain because the beneficiary never had any ticket at all. It is rather
like the difference between an heir apparent and an heir presumptive. The
heir apparent cannot be displaced while the heir presumptive can be displaced by the birth of a more direct heir. With the lottery ticket in possession, the remainderman has more of a property right than the person waiting
outside a locked door in the hope that it will one day open.
Besides the logical incoherence of treating a TOD deed as both nontestamentary and at the same time freely revocable without constraint, there
are bound to be situations in which non-revocability might be desirable.
For instance, making the beneficiary designation irrevocable may have
transfer tax consequences. 205 Because revocability is something that people
may want in certain circumstances, and not want in others, mandating revo204. The court in Farkas explained:
It is not a valid objection to this to say that Williams would never question Farkas’
conduct, inasmuch as Farkas could then revoke the trust and destroy what interest Williams has. Such a possibility exists in any case where the settlor has the power of revocation. Still, Williams has rights the same as any beneficiary, although it may not be
feasible for him to exercise them. Moreover, it is entirely possible that he might in certain situations have a right to hold Farkas’ estate liable for breaches of trust committed
by Farkas during his lifetime.
Farkas, 125 N.E.2d at 608.
205. For example, making an irrevocable lifetime designation of the beneficiary should set the
time for valuing the property for capital gains or transfer tax purposes.
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cability in all cases constrains those who want irrevocability, like co-tenants
who want their children to step into their interest and share it with the surviving co-tenant. At the same time, to the extent full revocability treats
TOD deed beneficiaries like will beneficiaries, with no property rights
whatsoever that can be enforced even after the transferor’s death, the limitations on how beneficiaries can enforce the terms of revocation may be a
cost that not all transferors are likely to want to pay. 206
Revocability also raises legal concerns in the case of enhanced-lifeestate deeds. One of the most significant legal uncertainties is whether life
tenants with reserved additional powers retain the power to revoke the remainder interest and restore the full fee simple title to themselves or a third
party without the joinder of the remainder beneficiaries. 207 In Bohr v. Nodway Valley Bank, 208 the Missouri Court of Appeals found that the life tenant
did not only possess a life estate, “but the express power to effectively restore her status as a fee owner in the [p]roperty by sale or other conveyance
of the [p]roperty or by any other act deemed legally sufficient to revoke the
remainder interest.” 209 This holding is similar to the landmark Florida case,
Oglesby v. Lee, 210 which held that where a father used a life-estate deed
with an enhanced reservation of power to give a remainder interest to his
daughter, a subsequent deed by the father to a third party extinguished the
daughter’s remainder interest. 211 And in Jennings v. Atkinson, 212 the Missouri Court of Appeals went so far as to hold that a deed from a husband
and wife to just the wife was enough to extinguish the rights of the remainder beneficiaries under a prior beneficiary deed. 213
But not all states have followed suit, nor have they all settled on what
acts constitute revocation of a recorded deed. 214 Can a will, a transfer out, a

206. For instance, in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), the United States Supreme Court
held that intestate heirs have no property rights to inherit that would be enforceable through a takings action, even if the decedents indeed have a property right to have their property pass according to their wills or the default rules of intestate succession. Id. at 711–12.
207. See Benjamin T. Jepson, Insuring Title Out of Enhanced Life Estates, THE FUND
CONCEPT (Attorneys’ Title Fund Servs., LLC , Orlando, Fla.), Oct. 2016, at 97, 100.
208. 411 S.W.3d 352, 359 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (emphasis omitted).
209. Id. at 359.
210. 73 So. 840 (Fla. 1917).
211. Id. at 841.
212. 456 S.W.3d 461 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
213. Id. at 467.
214. For instance, in Arkansas, revocation of a TOD deed with multiple owners requires revocation by all owners. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-12-608(d) (West 2007). In Nevada, revocation of a
TOD deed with multiple owners held in tenancy in common may be done by any one owner for
his or her share. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111.109(7) (West Supp. 2010). Some states allow a
will to revoke a TOD deed if expressly mentioned in the deed that the transferor retains that power. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 461.033(4) (West 2007). Many states do not allow that option.
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mortgage, or a contract constitute revocation? Unlike the will, which can
be revoked by physical act, a recorded real-estate deed cannot simply be
torn up and thrown away. Although the URPTODA provides that the only
way to revoke a TOD deed is by recording a new deed, 215 states that have
their own legislation have not always thought through the different ways
such a deed might be revoked. 216
There is no question that the simplicity, ease of transfer, and generally
low warrant widespread use of beneficiary deeds. But to make them all absolutely revocable under all circumstances is likely to work against the interests of some transferors and is, we believe, unnecessary, especially considering the incoherence of calling the deed non-testamentary. We can see
this incoherence play out in the context of anti-lapse statutes.
B. Anti-Lapse
Anti-lapse issues can easily arise with beneficiary deeds in both forms
of enhanced-life-estate deeds and true TOD deeds under the URPTODA
when the beneficiary predeceases the transferor. Under the URPTODA,
because the beneficiary received no property interest prior to the death of
the transferor, the beneficiary’s interest would lapse upon predeceasing the
transferor. 217 Presumably, the state’s anti-lapse statute could be used to
save the gift if the beneficiary had issue and was of the required degree of
relationship. 218 That is how a predeceased beneficiary would be treated under a will. But again, the TOD deed is declared to be non-testamentary, so
a real question would arise whether a state’s anti-lapse statute would even
apply if it is located in the probate code and is interpreted to apply only to
wills. Because many states have not addressed anti-lapse in the context of
will substitutes, it is conceivable that a TOD deed beneficiary who predeceases the transferor would not find the gift saved to benefit issue under a
narrowly conceived anti-lapse statute that applies only to wills. We should
ask whether formally naming the deed non-testamentary would trump the
deed’s function of effectuating a property transfer at death when deciding
whether to apply a state’s anti-lapse statute. 219
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-405(J) (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-15-405(4) (West
2004).
215. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 11 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
216. See Memorandum from Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 32, at 67–147 (discussing the
different statutory mechanisms in effect when the URPTODA was approved).
217. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 13(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
218. Section 2-603 of the UPC provides that the anti-lapse statute will apply only if the devisee is related to the testator through a grandparent or closer relative. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603
(1969) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010).
219. The ULC considered this issue. See Memorandum from Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note
32, at 39–41. See generally Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod, “I’m Not Quite Dead Yet!”: Rethinking the

2019]

TEARING DOWN THE WALL

549

On the other hand, in states that use enhanced-life-estate deeds with a
vested remainder subject to divestment, the death of the remainderman before the life tenant presumably would have no effect on the remainder because the transfer of the remainder was inter vivos. The only event that
would cause divestment would be the revocation of the remainder by the
life tenant. Absent revocation, the property would presumably pass to the
predeceased remainderman, with all the attendant issues of the transmissible-remainder problem. 220 The remainderman’s estate would need to be reopened and the property could be potentially taxed as it passed through that
deceased remainderman’s estate.
In states that use an enhanced-life-estate deed with a contingent remainder, the contingency would be the death of the transferor/life tenant
without having revoked. In that case, even the contingent remainder would
suffer the transmissible-remainder problem. Only if the contingent remainder were interpreted to require survival of the life tenant plus nonrevocation could one escape the transmissible-remainder problem. And
perhaps a state would apply a provision like the Uniform Probate Code’s
(“UPC”) Section 2-707 to require survivorship of a transferor of a beneficiary deed, just as it applies to trusts, with all of the attendant complexity
that that provision has created. 221 In such a case, the gift would lapse unless
the transferor provided for alternate beneficiaries.222 And the anti-lapse
Anti-Lapse Redistribution of a Dead Beneficiary’s Gift, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1017 (2013); Kevin
Purcell, Ghosts from the Grave—Inheriting Through the Predeceased Under Ohio Law, 50 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 189 (2003).
220. The transmissible remainder problem is an enduring one in the trusts and estates field. It
occurs when a decedent holds a remainder in property and predeceases the time when the remainder would vest in possession. When that happens, the value of the remainder passes through the
estate of the deceased remainderman, requiring probate, possibly re-opening the administration of
the estate, and possible taxation of the value of the remainder as it passes through the estate,
which are costs that are not offset for the remainderman by having been able to enjoy possession
of the property during life. See In re Estate of Houston, 201 A.2d 592 (Pa. 1964); UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-707 & CMT. (1969) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010) (amended to address the
transmissible remainder problem, although § 2-707 continues to be controversial among scholars
and practitioners).
221. Section 2-707 of the UPC provides that future interests in trusts will be deemed to be
contingent remainders rather than vested remainders, creating an alternate give in descendants of
the beneficiary, and if there are no descendants, than a resulting trust back to the settlor. UNIF.
PROB. CODE § 2-707 (1969) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010). This provision has generated
significant controversy. See, e.g., David Becker, Uniform Probate Code Section 2-707 and the
Experienced Estate Planner: Unexpected Disasters and How to Avoid Them, 47 UCLA L. REV.
339 (1999); Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Probate Code Upends the Law of Remainders, 94
MICH. L. REV. 148 (1995); Lawrence Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code Extends AntilapseType Protection to Poorly Drafted Trusts, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2309 (1996).
222. Section 2-707 of the UPC provides that if there is no issue of a predeceased remainderman, the gift lapses and passes back to the trust settlor. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707 (1969) (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N, amended 2010). If the statute applied here, the remainder would lapse and pass
back to the transferor, thus necessitating probate and possibly intestacy. Although Section 2-707
applies only to trusts, the remainder problem in an enhanced-life-estate deed poses the same issues
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statute would presumably not apply in a state that interpreted the remainder
interest to be contingent on survival unless, of course, the state followed
some version of the UPC’s presumption that survivorship language does not
automatically defeat application of the anti-lapse statute. 223
This anti-lapse conundrum is made particularly confusing by the state
variations between true TOD deeds and enhanced-life-estate deeds with actual inter vivos remainders. If the deed is non-testamentary, then you may
have transmissible-remainder problems and/or non-application of anti-lapse
statutes. But if the deed is testamentary, and anti-lapse applies, you may
run into will formality issues. And just consider how all of this would be
even more confusing if a beneficiary predeceased the transferor and the
transferor purportedly revoked using the wrong procedures. Who would
have a right to enforce the terms of revocation under the anti-lapse statute:
(a) the beneficiary’s issue, (b) devisees of the transferor, or (c) the transferor’s heirs? Ah, the whole thing is perplexing precisely because the TOD
deed attempts to cross an imaginary line in order to reap the benefits of both
categories in a legal world in which the imaginary line has consequences.
Giving the transferor complete revocability and no property rights passing
until death would mean the beneficiary has no inter vivos right to enforce
the revocability provision but anti-lapse might apply. Anti-lapse would
presumably not apply if a property interest passed inter vivos, but that
might fetter the power of free revocability.
C. The Transferor with a Testamentary Power of Appointment
Another situation in which beneficiary deeds in any of their myriad
forms may have unintended consequences is in the case of powers of appointment. If the deed is non-testamentary, as the URPTODA declares,
then a transferor might not be able to use one to exercise a testamentary
power of appointment. But if the property rights do not transfer until death,
a beneficiary deed might not be effective if created by a presentlyexercisable power. If the deed is an enhanced-life-estate deed with a vested
remainder subject to divestment, the transfer to the remaindermen inter vivos might not qualify as an appropriate exercise of a testamentary power
either. Even though property rights do not actually transfer until death,
none of these deeds might count as an exercise of a testamentary power of
appointment. Yet it is unclear whether either would count as an exercise of

as for trusts, so it would not be unreasonable for a state to apply the provision to a remainder interest in a beneficiary deed.
223. Section 2-707 and 2-603 of the UPC both provide that survivorship language in a testamentary or trust instrument is not enough to defeat application of the anti-lapse statute because
simple survivorship language, without designated alternate beneficiaries, is often boilerplate.
UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-707, 2-603 (1969) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010).
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a presently-exercisable power if the property rights do not transfer until
death.
Consider the situation of a widow who holds Blackacre in a life estate
with a testamentary power of appointment. She has two children who will
inherit all of her personal property under the default intestacy statutes of
every jurisdiction. She does not have enough additional property to justify
executing a will and going through probate. But, she has a life estate with a
power in the family home. It would be simple for her to execute a beneficiary deed, naming her children as the beneficiaries to take the property at
her death. Would the beneficiary deed qualify as a testamentary exercise of
her power? The URPTODA states that it is non-testamentary. Yet the
TOD deed would be a simpler way for her to exercise the power than
through a will. The TOD deed is cheaper to execute than a will and ought
to qualify as a testamentary exercise of the power because it takes effect at
death. Yet the statute claims the transfer is non-testamentary. And using
the TOD deed allows her to avoid probate, which she cannot do if she
makes a will or dies intestate and fails to exercise the power. 224 This uncertainty raises the question of whether courts would invalidate the transfer
because the TOD deed is deemed to be non-testamentary or because the execution of the deed was deemed inter vivos. The reliance on the bright line
between inter vivos and testamentary transfers, like the same bright line in
the context of powers, implies that, as the statute is written, only presently
exercisable powers can benefit from the URPTODA.
Moreover, the URPTODA assumes that the transferor has fee ownership of the real property. It would be an interesting question whether a
transferor who only has a life estate with a testamentary power could even
execute a TOD deed. One could presumably execute an enhanced-lifeestate deed to the extent the testamentary power is general and not special, 225 because the power to revoke would be equivalent to exercising the
power, unless of course the general power is testamentary and not presently-exercisable. 226
224. If she fails to exercise the power, the home will pass to the default takers, which may
require reopening the probate of the donor’s estate. Of course, if there are no default takers, then
the home would pass to the two children by intestacy but would likely still require court supervision merely to effectuate transferring the title documents. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF PROP.:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERs § 19.22 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
225. General powers of appointment allow the donee to exercise the power in the donee’s favor, while a special power can be exercised only to benefit others besides the donee. Powers can
also be exercisable immediately (presently-exercisable), in the future (inter vivos), or only at
death (testamentary). What kind of power the donee has is relevant to whether a TOD deed could
be used to exercise the power. See WRIGHT, supra note 114, at 275–76.
226. The differences between general and special powers could be important in this context.
A donee with a general power can always exercise the power on her behalf. If the power is presently-exercisable, the donee could capture the property in fee and then dispose of it pursuant to a
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We realize that pointing out these inconsistencies is a bit like accusing
an apple of not being an orange. But the point here is that there is no reason
a TOD deed or enhanced-life-estate deed has to be inconsistent with a life
estate and a testamentary power. Both, however, can fall into cracks and
fail to operate logically if we hew to the bright-line distinction between testamentary and inter vivos transfers. Of course, living people exercise testamentary powers to take effect after their death, just like the beneficiary
designation of a TOD deed. But calling the TOD deed non-testamentary
may invalidate efforts to use the deed form as a simple way to exercise a
testamentary power.
Powers of appointment are an underutilized aspect of estate planning,
but because the tax consequences of powers (whether general or special)
can be consequential, any new estate planning tool should work seamlessly
with powers. One could rightly question whether a transferor who holds a
life estate with a testamentary power of appointment would even be able to
execute a TOD real-estate deed, which presumes a power of revocation and,
in most cases, the power to transfer fee ownership. 227 But think how sensible it would be for that life tenant to not have to execute a will in order to
exercise the testamentary power of appointment, especially since the TOD
real-estate deed only becomes effective at death.228 But the simple definitional characterization of the TOD deed as non-testamentary could undermine this simple process when formalism supersedes intent.
Furthermore, the differences between the true TOD deed and an enhanced-life-estate deed could jeopardize efforts to use either to exercise a
power of appointment. If a state allows a transferor to only use an enhanced-life-estate deed, which requires giving away a present interest in a
vested or a contingent remainder, the deed may overstep the power of a life
tenant with a testamentary power, even if it is a general testamentary power.
Yet the whole purpose of the myriad will substitutes is to provide ways to
avoid probate, avoid wills and avoid their attendant formalities, and make
sensible procedures for the succession of property. To the extent the artificial divide between inter vivos and testamentary nomenclature and formalities could frustrate the transferor’s intentions, the mechanism may offer
promises it cannot keep.
beneficiary deed. But if the general power was testamentary, it could be exercised only in the donee’s will or other testamentary instrument. The question we pose, of course, is whether a beneficiary deed should be considered a testamentary instrument for purposes of exercising a testamentary power.
227. The URPTODA does not specify that the transferor of a TOD deed must be an owner in
fee. See UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
228. By using a TOD deed, the life tenant with a power would not have to use a will that
would require probate, and the life tenant can revoke the TOD deed freely during life. It is also
simpler for the beneficiary who would not need to pursue probate and can have the title changed
simply by filing a death certificate.
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D. Creditors Rights
Despite the URPTODA expressly providing that no property rights
transfer to the beneficiary of a TOD real-estate deed, 229 and, therefore, creditors of the beneficiary would have no claim on the property until the death
of the transferor, the same cannot be said of other forms of beneficiary
deeds, such as the enhanced-life-estate deed. In states that use contingent
remainders or executory interests to effectuate the TOD function, it would
be difficult to argue that no property rights in fact passed to the remainderman. Thus, creditors would likely have access to the property even if they
had to wait until the transferor actually died. Creditors of joint tenants and
of tenants in common can usually attach the debtor’s share of co-owned
property, but creditors of tenants by the entirety generally cannot. And as
Sawada v. Endo 230 illustrated, creditors in some states can attach a future
right of survivorship, even if they cannot attach the present estate of the
tenancy by the entirety. 231 Under the URPTODA, creditors of the transferor can attach to real property held under a TOD deed, but general creditors
of the transferor’s estate cannot attach TOD property once it passes to the
beneficiary unless the estate has insufficient assets to pay all of its debts. 232
But creditors of an enhanced-life-estate deed may only be able to attach to
the life estate, unless the state’s law permits a creditor to step into the shoes
of the transferor and thus force the revocation of the remainder. In that
event, the issues would be similar to those of creditor rights in discretionary
or spendthrift trusts. 233
Thus, differences between enhanced-life-estate deeds and true TOD
deeds may result in different effects regarding creditors’ rights. And, of
course, a surviving spouse can be a creditor vis-à-vis an elective share. If a
transferor used a beneficiary deed to avoid the elective share, whether the
deed was an enhanced-life-estate deed or a true TOD deed might make a
difference. In a state that gives a surviving spouse an elective share only on
the decedent spouse’s probate estate, it would seem that use of an enhanced-life-estate deed would preclude the surviving spouse from including
the transferred real estate in the elective estate. But if the decedent spouse
used a true TOD deed, in which the property transferred at death, the sur-

229. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
230. 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977).
231. Id. at 1296–98.
232. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT §§ 12, 13(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
233. Spendthrift and discretionary trusts pose significant policy concerns when transferors can
use them to avoid legal debts. Most states do not allow settlors to shield property from their own
legal creditors, although most states allow spendthrift and discretionary provisions to shield the
trust property from creditors of the beneficiary. See WRIGHT, supra note 114, at 533–45.
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viving spouse would have a valid claim that such property should be included in the elective estate even though it passes via a will substitute.
Admittedly, all will substitutes have the potential for abuse, although
those that require a present transfer are presumably less problematic because some control over the property was transferred inter vivos. Would a
surviving spouse have a stronger claim or a weaker claim that an enhancedlife-estate deed was a fraud on the elective share than a TOD deed? Could
creditors attach remainder interests or the transferor’s interests in enhancedlife-estate or true TOD deeds? These questions are meant to suggest that,
like so many aspects of beneficiary deeds, it matters for some creditor purposes whether the deed is deemed to pass an interest inter vivos, as with an
enhanced-life-estate deed, or is deemed to pass an interest only at death.
The URPTODA’s provision that the property rights transfer at death but
that the deed is non-testamentary can create problems for an elective share
that relies only on the probate estate. 234
It would seem that creditors of the transferor are likely better off in
states that use the true TOD deed and worse off in states that use enhancedlife-estate deeds because, at most, they could only attach the life estate in
the latter states. However, the corollary is likely true as well, in which
creditors of beneficiaries of enhanced-life-estate deeds are better off than
creditors of beneficiaries of TOD deeds. The result of the differential effects is that we are likely to see the same state variation with TODs as we
have seen with spendthrift provisions in trusts, where states have been willing to give certain privileged creditors a right to pierce a spendthrift provision. 235 The kind of technical parsing that the Sawada court did between
creditor rights to attach the present estate and/or the future interest is likely
to occur with all of these beneficiary deeds in the absence of clear statutory
language indicating how TOD deeds affect creditors rights, especially
creditors of the landowner and the beneficiary. 236 While we advocate for
234. Elective share statutes come in many different forms, but most can be distilled to one of
two basic types. The first gives the surviving spouse a statutory minimum of the decedent
spouse’s probate property only. The second gives the surviving spouse a statutory minimum in
most or all of the decedent’s spouse’s property, even property that passed inter vivos or through a
will substitute. States that follow the second model would include TOD deed property in the surviving spouse’s elective estate because they don’t distinguish between property passing through a
will or a will substitute. But in states that follow the probate property model, the ambiguous characterization of TOD deed real property as non-testamentary but passing at death may require surviving spouses to litigate whether such property will be included or not. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 45a-436(a) (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191, § 15 (2017); MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 3-203(a) (West 2019).
235. RONALD CHESTER, GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 227 Creditors’ Rights and Remedies (3d ed. 2005).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 230–231 (discussing Sawada v. Endo). In Sawada,
the court discussed four different types of creditor protections under tenancies by the entirety that
have profoundly different effects on heirs and creditors. See Sawada, 561 P.2d at 1294–95.

2019]

TEARING DOWN THE WALL

555

the adoption of beneficiary deeds, and certainly encourage states to adopt
clear language regarding creditor rights, we caution against states relying
on the courts to determine the extent of creditors’ rights when those rights
are likely to rise or fall on the basis of the inter vivos/testamentary divide.
E. Homestead
There are a few states, like California, Florida, and Minnesota, where
there are restrictions on the ability of a decedent to devise homestead property, free from the claims of surviving spouses and/or minor children. 237
But even beyond those few, beneficiary deeds may have unanticipated results when used to transfer homestead property. There are at least two issues that should be considered in the context of homestead.
In those states that limit the ability to devise homestead property, one
issue that inevitably arises is whether a beneficiary deed designation would
trump survivors’ homestead rights because the deed is non-testamentary.
Florida provides a good illustration. The Florida Constitution precludes decedents from devising their homestead to anyone if they have minor children, although they can devise it to their surviving spouse in fee if there are
adult children or no children. 238 If the decedent has minor children or does
not devise the homestead outright to a surviving spouse, the property must
descend by intestacy to the children and the spouse. 239 Florida courts have
held that a survivors’ homestead rights can be defeated, however, if a
homeowner uses a joint tenancy because upon the owner’s death there is no
homestead; it disappeared at death. 240 Under the same theory that no property rights remain with the decedent at death under a joint tenancy, a court
would likely rule the same way if a decedent executed an enhanced-lifeestate deed of the homestead property. 241 But it would seem that the opposite would result if the decedent executed a true TOD deed. Because there
would be no inter vivos transfer of property, the property would retain its
homestead character at the decedent’s death and thus the probate limitations
might apply.

237. CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 6500–6615 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. § 732.401 (2018);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-402 (West 2008).
238. FLA. CONST. Art. 10, § 4(c) (amended 1998); FLA. STAT. § 732.401; FLA. STAT.
§ 732.4015 (2018).
239. FLA. STAT. § 732.401.
240. Ostyn v. Olympic, 455 So.2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
241. See FLA. UNIF. TITLE STANDARDS ch. 6.10–.12 CMT. (FLA. BAR, Proposed Standards,
2019) (on file with authors) (“Although Lady Bird Deeds are used prevalently in Florida for various purposes among which is the avoidance of probate by the holder of the life estate, there is no
Florida Statute governing such conveyances and scant judicial authority supporting the practice.
The practitioner should thus be aware that this Standard and its guidance represents the consensus
view of the Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar.”).
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The second issue has to do with the creditor protections that pass to
certain recipients of homestead property. If the property has to maintain its
status as homestead through a narrowly defined transfer channel (intestacy
or will), then the creditor protections might be lost, even if the beneficiary
is a protected recipient. On the other hand, a well-drafted statute should
provide homestead protections regardless of the method of transfer. Unfortunately, the poor drafting problem most likely lies with the narrowness of
many homestead provisions written over a century ago, rather than with
beneficiary deed statutes adopted in the last decade. This problem is exacerbated because the creditor protections of homestead are often sorely neglected in state probate codes. 242
Other issues also might arise if homestead creditor protections require
ownership of the homestead in situations where a transferor uses an enhanced-life-estate deed or a trust. All of this is not to say that beneficiary
deeds are a bad idea; quite the contrary. Instead, we simply aim to point
out how the designation of the beneficiary deed as either testamentary or
inter vivos may conflict with certain homestead protections and yield unintended consequences. The solution is not to forego beneficiary deeds or
homestead, but to make a conscious effort to harmonize all succession
rights in a way that does not rely on the inter vivos/testamentary distinction.
F. Trust Owner as Transferor
Another legal uncertainty that often leads to litigation is who can be a
grantor or a beneficiary for an effective beneficiary deed. The courts in
Colorado have decided that a trust may not be a grantor because the language of their state law implies that the owner must be a natural person. 243
The importance of the language used in the statute was also central to the
2011 Missouri case, Delcour v. Rakestraw. 244 In that case, the Missouri
Court of Appeals considered the language of the recently amended definition of “owner.” 245 Prior to the amendment, the court in Pippin v. Pippin 246
242. For instance, Maine protects homestead only up to $30,000, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
18-A, § 2-401 (2009), which is quite inadequate to meaningfully protect the home. And, California provides for $75,000 to $175,000 homestead creditor protections in its civil procedure code,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.730 (West 2018), but it also provides that a life estate or a term of
years in the homestead may be granted to a surviving spouse or minor child, respectively, at the
discretion of the court, with only a passing reference to the creditor protections in its probate code,
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6520-6528 (West 1991).
243. Fischbach v. Holzberlein, 215 P.3d 407, 409 (Colo. App. 2009) (holding that a beneficiary deed was invalid because the grantor was a trust and “the transfer of real property by a beneficiary deed shall be effective only ‘upon the death of the owner” and “the owner must be a natural person and not an entity”).
244. 340 S.W.3d 320 (Mo. App. 2011).
245. Id. at 322–23. The relevant definition reads: “‘Owner’, a person or persons having a
right, exercisable alone or with others, regardless of the terminology used to refer to the owner in
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invalidated a beneficiary deed executed by the owner to transfer upon the
death of the owner and a non-owner to the beneficiaries. 247 In 2005, the
Missouri legislature amended the definition to resolve the issue of who constituted an “owner.” 248 Even though the salient facts in both Delcour and
Pippin were nearly identical—namely, that the transfer was not to occur until the death of both an owner and a non-owner—the court in Delcour held
that “[t]he 2005 amendment does not affect Pippin’s application here or
yield a different outcome.” 249 These two cases illustrate the complexity involved in drafting the language of a statute to achieve the desired result.
Even though the Missouri statute was amended purportedly to change the
interpretation of who could be an owner for purposes of a beneficiary deed,
the amendment failed to have that effect. Similarly, the URPTODA perpetuates the limitation that a TOD deed can only be executed by an individual person. 250
But imagine how convoluted things might get when homestead property is transferred into trust, and then the trustee attempts to use a beneficiary
deed to effectuate a transfer, especially if the trustee has a testamentary
power of appointment and the beneficiaries predecease and their issue hope
to take under the state’s anti-lapse statute. Although courts have had a
longer time to develop precedents on homestead and trusts 251 than on beneficiary deeds in any of these contexts, the multiplication of uncertainty on
top of indeterminacy could cause significant problems for the transferor
who is simply looking for a straightforward way to manage real property.

any written beneficiary designation, to designate the beneficiary of a nonprobate transfer, and includes joint owners. The provisions of this subdivision shall apply to all beneficiary deeds executed and filed at any time, including, but not limited to, those executed and filed on or before
August 28, 2005.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 461.005(8) (1995) (as
amended 2005)).
246. 154 S.W.3d 376 (Mo. App. 2004).
247. Id. at 381, 382.
248. MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.005(8) (West 2006); see supra note 245.
249. Delcour, 340 S.W.3d at 323 (reversing and remanding the case to the lower court for
findings in conformity with their opinion).
250. See UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 2(7) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009)
(limiting the definition of a “transferor” to an “individual”).
251. See Seth Williams, Note, Property Law—Homestead Exemption—A Beneficiary Interest
Can Support a Homestead Exemption in Arkansas and a Look at Other Interests Sufficient to Support a Homestead Exemption, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 173 (2011); see also Fitton v.
Bank of Little Rock, 365 S.W.3d 888 (Ark. 2010) (citing related cases therein); In re Estate of
Sloan, 496 S.W.3d 299 (Ct. App. Tx. 2016).
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V. THE UNBRIDGEABLE(?) DIVIDE BETWEEN INTER VIVOS AND
TESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS
Commentators, 252 judges, 253 legislators, 254 and ULC reporters 255 have
operated for centuries on the assumption that there is a fundamental distinction between inter vivos and testamentary transfers. Inter vivos transfers
are made during the donor’s lifetime and require delivery, at least to the extent delivery is feasible given the type of property. 256 Testamentary transfers occur upon death and require either a valid will executed according to
the state’s will formalities or the estate passes according to the strict default
rules of intestate succession. Property passing at death via a testamentary
transfer must be probated. Inter vivos and testamentary transfers are treated
differently for transfer-tax purposes, 257 and no presumptive beneficiary has
any right to receive a testamentary gift or enforce a contract to make a testamentary gift. The mental capacity to make inter vivos gifts is higher than
to make testamentary gifts. 258 Capital gains taxes, the step-up in basis, and
who pays the taxes on gains in value can differ dramatically between inter
vivos and testamentary gifts. There are countless differences in legal consequences between inter vivos and testamentary gifts beyond the formalistic
requirement of a present transfer or execution in conformity with the will
formalities.
The idea that there is a formal divide between inter vivos gifts and testamentary gifts, wherein a present property interest is transferred in the
252. Ronald R. Volkmer, Nebraska’s Real Property Transfer-on-Death Act and Power of Attorney Act: A New Era Begins, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 503 (2013).
253. See, e.g., Miller v. Cothran, 280 S.W.3d 580, 582–83 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008); Bickers v.
Shenandoah Val. Nat. Bank of Winchester, 88 S.E.2d 889, 896–97 (Va. 1955).
254. Legislators who fail to amend probate codes that require the will formalities, which all
states require, ultimately accede to the distinction between testamentary and inter vivos transfers.
Some states, however, have adopted the UPC’s dispensing power or harmless error doctrine,
which allows wills to be probated even if the formalities have not been met. UNIF. PROB. CODE
§ 2-503 (1969) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010). These states are beginning to blur the line,
but it still remains persistent in most states. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2019);
HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 560 (2019).
255. See UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009)
(commenting that because the transfer is deemed non-testamentary there is no need for the will
formalities).
256. See Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y. 1986), for an example of how constructive
delivery is sufficient when a future interest in a chattel is made the subject of a lifetime give.
257. See Samuel R. Scarcello, Transfer Taxes in Flux: A Comparison of Alternative Plans for
Great Reform, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 321, 328 (2012) (discussing different tax implications of gift
and estate taxes).
258. See Mark Glover, Rethinking the Testamentary Capacity of Minors, 79 MO. L. REV. 69,
86 (2014); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 cmt.
d (2003) (“Because an irrevocable gift depletes financial resources that the donor may yet need,
the standard for mental capacity to make an irrevocable gift is higher than that for making a
will.”).
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former during the donor’s lifetime, and no property interests transfer in the
latter, makes sense when we think of the timing of the transfer of the fundamental rights to dominion and control that accompany a gift. The property sticks either transfer during life of the donor or at the donor’s death. And
decedents who want to maintain absolute control up until death may certainly do so by making only testamentary gifts, and any property over
which they retain that power will generally be deemed testamentary when it
passes to successors.
But in the context of what property gets probated, and whether the will
formalities are required, the distinction makes less sense. In a number of
circumstances, the law has rejected the fine distinctions, relying more on
legal fictions than on actual transfers or on who has dominion and control.
Life insurance, POD/TOD accounts, and revocable standby trusts all push
the envelope, highlighting the fiction that an inter vivos property interest
has transferred even though the donor retains the full power to revoke. But
the beneficiary real-estate deed seems to pose a much more substantial
threat to maintenance of the divide than the other will substitutes. It seems
to us that the beneficiary real-estate deed, in whichever form it takes, so
profoundly challenges the juridical distinction that maybe it is time to admit
that the emperor has no clothes. Are we not at a sufficiently mature point in
our legal system that we can decide for ourselves what formalities we will
require for the different mechanisms of property succession, dependent on
the policy goals and needs of today’s modern testators, without relying on
an arbitrary set of distinctions that arose because of the unique crown prerogatives of landholding in feudal England?
Professor Doug Miller’s 1991 article advocated for abolishing the
formal distinctions between inter vivos and testamentary formalities when
the UPC was reformed to permit the harmless-error doctrine. 259 Instead of
applying more Band-Aids to the broken probate system, he argued we
should adopt a set of functional rules that apply regardless of whether the
donative mechanism is a will or a will substitute. 260 There is something refreshing about that view. To the extent we can protect donative intent and
guarantee the authenticity of the expression, we can institute whatever
forms and formalities we would like. The important point is that we would
not need to legislate that a beneficiary deed is non-testamentary in order to
avoid application of the will formalities requirements if we simply admitted
that testamentary transfers can be effective if executed with any variety of
formal requirements. We could also provide that not all property passing at
death should require probate. Although some inter vivos transfers should
259. Miller, Part Two, supra note 14, at 717–19 (advocating a unified approach to the formalities of wills and will substitutes).
260. Id.
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require probate, let us first think about the many ways in which certain laws
have already rejected the formal distinctions or have worked around the
technical rules to prevent donors from elevating form over substance and
manipulating the juridical divide.
An obvious example is the IRC’s inclusion in the gross taxable estate
of property in revocable trusts, property transferred in the two years prior to
death, and virtually any property over which the donor had a power of appointment or enjoyed a lifetime benefit.261 The IRC recognizes that donors
want the benefits of probate avoidance, easy revocability or ease of amending donative documents, and may want to avoid the testamentary formalities while still maintaining maximum control up until death. The IRC blurs
the inter vivos/testamentary line not only with regard to the formalities but
for those transfers that are not functionally inter vivos. With amendments
to the transfer-tax regime to unify gift and estate taxes, one of the reasons
for manipulating transfers has nearly disappeared. As a result, the IRC
treats many technically inter vivos transfers as testamentary because the
property functionally transfers at death.
Many states’ elective-share statutes do the same by including nonprobate property, property transferred inter vivos before death, and property
over which the donor had a power of appointment, treating them all as essentially testamentary transfers. 262 The response of Florida and New York
to will substitutes blurring the legal line has been to require that dispositive
provisions of revocable trusts be executed according to the will formalities
because they are essentially testamentary transfers.263
As Miller has also noted, the “relatively informal procedures for transferring property by means of the will substitutes and the relatively flexible
approach of courts in giving them effect, makes the ritualistic emphasis on
form when the transferor has elected to dispose of property by will seem
unjust and irrational.” 264 Although we agree with Miller’s argument that
the disparity between the formalities of wills and will substitutes weighs in
favor of a unified, functional set of formalities for all instruments of succession, regardless of type, we are making a somewhat different point in this
Article. It is not just the fact of the formalities that cause problems, although the differences in formalities are often used to justify the differences
in treatment and interpretation of different donative mechanisms. Rather,
the juridical divide between inter vivos and testamentary itself causes prob-

261. I.R.C. § 2033 (2012).
262. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.2035 (2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-208 (West 1994);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:8-1, -3 (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-304, -305 (West 2012).
263. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b) (2018); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 7-1.17(a)
(McKinney 2010).
264. Miller, Part One, supra note 14, at 184–85 (footnote omitted).
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lems when the tools and mechanisms of donative succession intentionally
blur that line. So long as there is a line that provides that testamentary gifts
are probated and non-testamentary gifts are not subject to probate, there are
real-world implications that also make little sense. 265
There are a number of ways we could deal with the situation. One
would be to eliminate the heady differences between testamentary and inter
vivos gifts, as the IRC has essentially done, and instead identify a set of
formalities for execution of all donative documents. We could then require
that all donative instruments that do not rely on certain formalities or on
third party forms and interests would require probate. Or, we could eliminate some of the distinctions between testamentary and inter vivos transfers
and rely, instead, solely on the relinquishment of some essential powers of
dominion and control. If we could start at the beginning and establish a
logical system for managing the succession of property at death, what
would that look like? Every new tool, including the TOD real-estate deed
or enhanced-life-estate deed, is an attempt to gain certain advantages in
terms of probate avoidance or revocability in a legal system that still relies
on arbitrary lines and differences established eight centuries ago when a
property owner’s greatest fear was losing his estate to his feudal lord in
primer seisin if he died with an underage heir whose marriage rights fell into wardship. The world is so fundamentally different today that it seems
only reasonable that we can redesign the legal holes and pegs to fit today’s
testators, rather than having to fit our family-planning needs into the legal
categories of Coke’s or Blackstone’s day.
VI. CONCLUSION
The beneficiary real-estate deed is the newest will substitute, but it
pushes the juridical binary of inter vivos and testamentary transfers into a
truly incoherent dimension. The deed itself, whether in the form of a true
TOD deed or an enhanced-life-estate deed, is an important addition to the
estate planner’s toolbox and is a valuable mechanism for a large swath of
the population to transfer real property upon death smoothly and efficiently.
But the mechanism itself distorts the boundaries between will substitutes
and wills and should make us rethink the artificial distinction that we continue to carry forward from centuries-old feudal English land law. We anticipate that there will continue to be significant legal problems with this
new tool precisely because of the distinction between inter vivos and testamentary transfers, which is fluid and malleable at times, and rigid and impenetrable at others. The lack of consistency will inevitably lead to confu265. Not only are there probate implications, but tax, trust, elective share implications, and
intended beneficiaries might not get their intended bequests if TOD deeds fail.
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sion, error, and litigation. The simple question of whether a beneficiary
deed can be used by a life tenant with a testamentary power of appointment
illustrates the problem, and it is not with the beneficiary deed itself, but rather with the adjectives we use to describe so many trusts and estates functions.
There are very important and valuable reasons for distinguishing between inter vivos and testamentary powers, but the nomenclature we use
can impede effective estate planning in situations where the distinctions are
merely ones of form. How simple it would have been if the URPTODA
had provided that the TOD deed was testamentary in nature but was simply
exempted from the will formalities because real-estate deeds have their own
formal execution requirements. Instead, in continuing to reiterate the traditional discursive categories, the statute perpetuates a legal binary that is irrational and counterproductive in many situations. We can only wonder if
this new will substitute will provide the final push to completely restructure
the system of testamentary succession of property and replace it with a coherent and rational system that does not pay tribute to outdated formal categories that have lost their functional meaning. If it has become true that the
only people who will suffer the consequences of the inter vivos/testamentary divide are those without access to sophisticated planners
who can work around the arcane and outdated categories, then the system
needs to be overhauled. When the inter vivos/testamentary binary becomes
solely a trap for the unwary, and it can be easily drafted around, then we
open ourselves to the legitimate critique that the law serves only to keep
lawyers in business and does not serve the succession needs of clients.

